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MINIMIZING UNNECESSARY RACIAL
DIFFERENCES IN OCCUPATIONAL TESTING
MARTIN M. SHAPIRO*
MICHAEL H. SLUTSKY**
RICHARD F. WATT**
I. INTRODUCTION
Since the early 1900s the United States has experienced an explosive
growth in occupational licensing and certification.' Oregon enacted the first
* Professor, Department of Psychology, Emory University, and member of the Georgia
bar. Dr. Shapiro served as a consultant to Golden Rule Insurance Company in the litigation
discussed in this article and as Golden Rule's representative on the advisory committee estab-
lished by the settlement.
** Partners in the Chicago law firm of Cotton, Watt, Jones & King, which represented
Golden Rule Insurance Company in the litigation discussed in this article, as well as in other
matters. The authors wish to thank Thomas D. Allison, Wesley Kennedy, Thomas Hancuch,
Elaine Hale and Gillian Siegel for their assistance.
1. Although the terms "licensing" and "certification" are at times used interchangea-
bly, there are distinctions. Licensing is "the process by which an agency of government grants
permission to an individual to engage in a given occupation upon finding that the applicant has
attained the minimal degree of competency necessary to ensure that the public health, safety,
and welfare will be reasonably well protected." B. Shimberg, Occupational Licensing: A Pub-
lic Perspective 19-20, (ETS 1980) (quoting HEW, Credentialing Health Manpower 4 (HEW
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barber licensing law in 1899, since then every state has adopted licensing
requirements for dozens of occupations.' A 1980 government study found
that more than 800 occupations and professions were regulated by state
law.3 In Illinois, for example, the Department of Registration and Educa-
tion tests and licenses those who wish to engage in more than fifty occupa-
tions, including would-be teachers, nurses, real estate brokers, funeral direc-
tors, embalmers, land surveyors, shorthand reporters, and polygraph
operators.4 In addition, the Department of Insurance tests and licenses in-
surance agents and brokers.5 With respect to teachers alone, nearly every
state has adopted testing requirements as an element of educational "re-
form," assertedly to improve the quality of teaching.6 Occupational testing
is now so pervasive that there is little reason to expect it to diminish in the
foreseeable future.
Private test developers have grown to meet and stimulate the demand
Publication No. (OS) 77-50057 1977)). Thus licensing is performed by a governmental agency
and concerns minimum competency levels.
Certification, on the other hand, "is the process by which a governmental or non-govern-
mental agency or association grants authority to use a specified title to an individual who has
met predeterminated qualifications." Id. Governmental certification requirements, unlike li-
censing, do not determine whether a person may engage in a particular occupation, but rather
whether he may use a title, such as certified public accountant. Certification standards are
often above the level of minimum competency. Id. at 21-22. Non-governmental certification is
frequently administered by professional or trade groups as a means of recognizing persons who
have met certain specialized standards of practice. Id.
Because the principles discussed in this article apply generally to tests used for purposes
of licensing or certification, the term "licensing" is used to include certification, except where
the context indicates otherwise.
2. B. Shimberg, supra note 1, at 4 (citing K. Greene & R. Gay, Occupational Regu-
lation in the U.S. (Employment & Training Admin., U.S. Dept. of Labor 1980)).
3. Id. The study did not include federal or local occupational regulation. Id.
4. R. Stacker, Occupational and Professional Licensing Law 57 (Ill. Inst. for Contin.
Legal Educ. 1980).
5. Likewise, in New York, various agencies are responsible for testing and licensing
persons seeking to engage in a variety of occupations. The Education Department administers
the admission to and practice of some 28 professions, including nursing, landscape architec-
ture, engineering, dentistry, social work, shorthand reporting and occupational therapy. N.Y.
Educ. Law §§ 6500-6515 (Consol. 1985). The New York Public Health Department, under
the direction of the Public Health Commissioner, tests and licenses funeral directors, under-
takers and embalmers. N.Y. Pub. Health Law §§ 3420-3422 (Consol. 1985). The Superinten-
dent of Insurance oversees the licensing of insurance agents and brokers. N.Y. Insur. Law §§
1102-1109 (Consol. 1985).
6. J.T. Sandefur, State Assessment Trends, in 7 AACTE Briefs No. 6 at 12 (Aug.
1986); G.P. Smith, Unresolved Issues & Developments in Teacher Competency Testing, 8
Urban Educator No. I at 1, 2 (Fall 1986)(citing J.T. Sandefur, State Assessment Trends, 6
AACTE Briefs No. 2 at 21-23 (ERIC No. ED 260-115 Mar. 1985)). See also Flippo, Teacher
Certification Testing Across the United States & A Consideration of Some of the Issues 4-5,
presented at Annual Meeting of the American Educational Research Association (ERIC No.
ED 260-115 Mar. 31-Apr. 4, 1985).
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for occupational tests. Educational Testing Service (ETS), which styles it-
self "the nation's leading testing organization," 7 is a major vendor of occu-
pational tests. In 1973, ETS established a Center for Occupational and Pro-
fessional Assessment (COPA) s to develop and administer licensing and
certification examinations for government and quasi-public organizations.
Occupational testing is big business: the ETS multistate real estate agents'
licensing examination alone, used by twenty-five jurisdictions, has tested
nearly two million applicants.' ETS also markets a multistate electrical li-
censing test, a certification examination for the Professional Golfers Associ-
ation, a test for certified information systems auditors, and an energy audi-
tors' certification program."0 In 1987 ETS added a test to certify the
competence of aerobics instructors."'
A principal allure of "standardized" tests is their purported objectivity
and absence of bias. Given the proliferation of such tests for occupational
licensing, the possibility of racial bias is a serious matter. How to define,
identify, and remedy possible racial bias in testing confronts the psychologi-
cal profession with a troublesome problem for which there are no agreed-
upon answers. A closely-related issue faces lawyers and courts, namely, the
standards applicable to claims of racial bias in occupational tests. The de-
gree to which Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 196412 bars discrimina-
tion in occupational licensing is unresolved. Nor is the standard clear for
determining the requisite discriminatory intent13 to establish a claim of ra-
cial discrimination in occupational testing under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment."'
7. ETS, The Center for Occupational and Professional Assessment - Licensing, Certi-
fication, and Assessment 1 (1983).
8. Id. at 2.
9. ETS, Real Estate Licensing Examinations, Bulletin of Information for Candidates
at 4 (1985).
10. ETS, Report of the 1983 ETS Visiting Committee at 9 (June, 1983).
11. ETS, 1987 Annual Report at 24.
12. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e.
13. In Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976), the Supreme Court held that proof
of discriminatory intent is required under the Fourteenth Amendment equal protection clause.
14. See, e.g., Comment, Challenges to Preemployment Tests After Washington v. Da-
vis, 5 HOFSTRA L. REV. 893 (1977). See also Bennett, Reflections on the Role of Motivation
Under the Equal Protection Clause, 79 Nw. U.L. REv. 1009 (1985); Binion, "Intent" and
Equal Protection" A Reconsideration, 1983 Sup. CT. REV. 397; Comment, Discriminatory
Purpose and Mens Rea: The Tortured Argument of Invidious Intent, 93 YALE L.J. 111
(1983); Clark, Legislative Motivation and Fundamental Rights in Constitutional Law, 15
SAN DIEGO L. REV. 953 (1978); Eisenberg, Disproportionate Impact and Illicit Motive: Theo-
ries of Constitutional Adjudication, 52 N.Y.U.L. REv. 36 (1977); Perry, Disproportionate
Impact Theory of Racial Discrimination, 125 U. PA. L. REv. 540 (1977); Schwemm, From
Washington to Arlington Heights and Beyond: Discriminatory Purpose in Equal Protection
Litigation, 1977 U. ILL. L.F. 961; Ely, Legislative and Administrative Motivation in Constitu-
tional Law, 79 YALE L.J. 1205 (1970).
1989]
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This article considers both the psychometric and the legal problems
arising from apparent racial bias in tests used for occupational licensing.
The article focuses on a particular Illinois lawsuit-Golden Rule Insurance
Co. v. Washburn'5 -which was settled after eight years in court. The
Golden Rule Insurance Company, joined by several job applicants who
"failed" the ETS-prepared examination, challenged the examination alleg-
ing that the test was racially biased and thus unfairly excluded minorities,
particularly Blacks, from employment as insurance agents and brokers. 6
The settlement agreement, executed in November 1984, imposed on
the Illinois Department of Insurance and ETS a comprehensive set of pro-
cedures for assembling test questions into test forms. Those procedures gen-
erally require that, in each content area, questions with the least difference
in Black and White passing rates have priority and that questions be pre-
tested before being used for scoring purposes. In addition, the settlement
provided for annual public reporting of detailed test statistics, including
passing rates by different racial groups. The settlement is intended to mini-
mize disparities between Black and White passing rates in insurance licens-
ing tests in Illinois. The settlement thus represents a practical approach to a
widespread problem, and, more importantly, there is significant evidence
that the settlement works.
This article considers how the psychometric profession has dealt with
the issue of racial bias in testing and why current approaches have not
eliminated or significantly reduced racial differences in test performance.
The article then examines the legal framework in which lawyers and courts
address racial bias in occupational tests, concluding that current legal doc-
trine fails to protect adequately against test bias. Finally, in the absence of
effective psychometric means for detecting and reducing test bias, and given
the present unsatisfactory state of the law, the authors argue that the ap-
proach employed in the Golden Rule settlement represents a practical
means for reducing racial differences in test performance.
II. PSYCHOMETRIC TECHNIQUES FOR MINIMIZING RACIAL BIAS
Although every year millions of Americans take standardized tests
which often significantly determine career paths and opportunities, test de-
15. Golden Rule Life Ins. Co. v. Washburn, No. 419-76 (Cir. Ct. Sangamon County,
Ill., settled Nov. 20, 1984). See Golden Rule Life Insurance Co. v. Mathias, 86 Ill. App. 3d
320, 408 N.E.2d 310 (1980).
16. Over the past ten years, nearly a million candidates for insurance licenses have
been required to take the ETS-prepared test. ETS Annual Report 24-25 (1983) (19 states and
Bermuda); ETS, 1986 MILP Advisory Board Meeting Handout 1-2 (Oct. 1986). In Illinois in
1985, nearly ten thousand persons took the life insurance portion of the examination. See ETS,
1986 Illinois Candidates for Licensure in Life Insurance and Accident & Health Insurance
(April 1986) Table I.
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velopers remain essentially unregulated. It is ironic that an industry which
claims it can devise objective measures of the educational and occupational
abilities of so many individuals is itself subject to no meaningful measure-
ment of how well and fairly it measures others.
The criterion for determining how well a test performs is test validity.
While, on a theoretical level, there are various methods of validation, in
practice the testing industry uses only one: content validity. As discussed
below, that method and the existing procedures for detecting racial "bias"
are not equal to the task.
The American Psychological Association (APA) has established Stan-
dards for Educational and Psychological Testing.'7 The Standards do not
define "bias," although they do define two variants: "item bias" and "pre-
dictive bias." The Standards do not require, however, an absence of "pre-
dictive bias" as a necessary condition for test validity. In fact, the Stan-
dards mandate that predictive bias be investigated only when there is
reason to suspect that it exists and then only if an investigation is techni-
cally feasible. Moreover, the APA offers its Standards simply as "guid-
ance" for the exercise of "professional judgment." Similarly, the federal
government's Uniform Guidelines on Employee Selection Proceduress do
not define "bias"; they define "unfairness."' 9
Nonetheless, a common thread runs through the various definitions:
"[A]n understanding of bias-as psychometric features that somehow mis-
represent the abilities of one group--is expected to guide the detection of
bias in particular instances."'2 In a general sense, bias is a failure to be
straight; with respect to fabric, bias is a cut diagonal to a seam or pattern.2'
For present purposes, racial bias is the characteristic-admittedly difficult
to identify and isolate-which causes a test to be other than straight with
respect to a racial group. Members of that group do not perform as well on
the test as do non-members, and the degree of disparity is not solely the
result of differences in education or ability.
The real likelihood of possible racial bias in occupational testing is a
matter of urgent concern. The problem, of course, is how to identify and
eliminate the factors which make a test racially biased. Test developers and
17. American Educational Research Association, American Psychological Association,
& National Council on Measurement in Education, Standards for Educational and Psycho-
logical Testing (1985) [hereinafter APA Standards].
18. 29 C.F.R. §§ 1607.1 - 1607.18 (1985) [hereinafter Uniform Guidelines].
19. Psychometricians debate the relationship between unfairness and bias and have
proposed various definitions of each term. See R. BERK, HANDBOOK OF METHODS FOR DE-
TECTING TEST BIAS (1982) [hereinafter BERK].
20. L. Shepard, Definitions of Bias, in Berk, supra note 19, at 25.
21. Webster's New International Dictionary of the English Language 262 (2d ed. una-
bridged 1952).
1989]
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psychologists have not fully come to grips with racial bias. Traditional psy-
chometric techniques do not work very well, and governmental and self-
regulatory efforts have led to little more than a recognition that the prob-
lem exists.
A. Predictive Bias and Criterion Validation
Occupational testing is justified by the need to protect the public
health, safety, and welfare by excluding persons who lack minimum qualifi-
cations from certain occupations. The unstated assumption is that there is a
demonstrable connection between adequate performance on an occupational
test and adequate performance on the job. If that connection cannot be
shown, the test lacks validity: it does not test what it purports to test, and
the public health, safety, and welfare are not served.
Psychometricians recognize what they call predictive bias: "the system-
atic under-or-over-prediction of criterion performance for people belonging
to groups differentiated by characteristics not relevant to criterion perform-
ance."22 Predictive bias exists in a test (or, in the language of the federal
Uniform Guidelines, the test is unfair) if members of one racial group char-
acteristically score lower than members of another racial group and the
differences are not reflected in job performance .2 An example of the results
of a racially unfair test is shown in Figure 1.
22. APA Standards, supra note 17, at 93. Under the Standards, "criterion perform-
ance" in the occupational licensing context would be a measure of job performance. Id.
23. Uniform Guidelines, supra note 18, § 16V, 29 C.F.R. § 1607.16V.
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 23, No. 3 [1989], Art. 1
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol23/iss3/1
OCCUPATIONAL TESTING
Figure 1
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Figure 1 reveals that the average Black job performance is approxi-
mately equal to the average White job performance but, at any given level
of job performance, Whites score higher on the test than Blacks. Predictive
bias is present despite the fact that there is a reasonably positive relation-
ship between test performance and job performance considering all test
takers, both Black and White. The regression line which best fits the Black
scores is not the same as the regression line which best fits the White
scores.
When a regression line is drawn which best fits all of the points-both
Black and White-and predicted job performance is based on that line, the
bias becomes clear. Black job performance is under-predicted (actual Black
job performance is higher than predictions based upon the regression line
for all data points), and White job performance is over-predicted (actual
White performance is lower than predictions based upon the regression
line). Figure 2 graphically illustrates the bias. If the test were used to select
1989]
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persons "qualified" to engage in the occupation (and to exclude those who
failed), the result would be a disproportionate over-selection of Whites and
a corresponding under-selection of Blacks.
Figure 2
0 0
0 X
x 0 Black
XWhite
I I I I I I
40 50 60 70 80 90
Selection Test
In practice, matters are not so simple. Job performance can be mea-
sured only for individuals who have been hired. The measurement of job
performance is necessarily restricted to only those individuals who scored
satisfactorily on the test in question. It is impossible to determine the rela-
tionship between test performance and job performance for the entire set of
individuals who originally took the test. Since the test itself determines who
will be hired and therefore whose job performance will be measured, indi-
viduals who fail the test never have an opportunity to demonstrate their
abilities on the job. Furthermore, subjective elements creep into virtually all
evaluations of job performance. No matter how objective a test, its validity
as a predictor depends in part on a non-objective evaluation of job
performance.
70-
4 60-
,50
o 5o
[Vol. 23
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Criterion validity-the correlation between test performance and job
performance-is therefore difficult to achieve. A necessary, but not a suffi-
cient, condition for criterion validity arguably should be the absence of pre-
dictive bias, but there is no firm consensus that this be so. There is general
agreement that the developers and users of an occupational test have an
obligation to come forward with evidence that the test is valid, but not that
the evidence show that predictive bias was investigated and found absent.2 4
Implicit in this failure to adopt a clear standard is the view that it would be
impossible to demonstrate lack of predictive bias with regard to every con-
ceivable group of people. The possible number of definable groups is simply
too great. However, such a showing is not even required with respect to
large minority groups, such as Blacks and Hispanics.
The APA Standards fail to require the absence of predictive bias as a
necessary condition of criterion validity; the Uniform Guidelines do require
consideration of less discriminatory alternatives25 to a challenged test upon
a showing that the test has "adverse impact" on a protected group but is
nevertheless job-related. But "adverse impact" and "less discriminatory al-
ternatives" have no defined meaning in the psychometric profession, even
though the Uniform Guidelines provide a numerical measure of "adverse
impact."12 6
24. See, e.g., APA Standards, supra note 17, Standards 1.6, 1.7 and 3.10. The APA
Standards provide:
Standard 1.6: When content-related evidence serves as a significant demonstration of va-
lidity for a particular test use, a clear definition of the universe represented, its relevance
to the proposed test use, and the procedures followed in generating test content to re-
present that universe should be described. When the content sampling is intended to re-
flect criticality rather than representativeness, the rationale for the relative emphasis
given to critical factors in the universe should also be described carefully.
Standard 1.7: When subject-matter experts have been asked to judge whether items are
an appropriate sample of a universe or are correctly scored, or when criteria are com-
posed of rater judgments, the relevant training, experience, and qualifications of the ex-
perts should be described. Any procedure used to obtain a consensus among judges about
the appropriate specifications of the universe and the representativeness of the samples
for the intended objectives should also be described.
Standard 3.10: When previous research indicates the need for studies of item or test
performance differences for a particular kind of test for members of age, ethnic, cultural,
and gender groups in the population of test takers, such studies should be conducted as
soon as is feasible. Such research should be designed to detect and eliminate aspects of
test design, content, or format that might bias test scores for particular groups.
(Conditional).
Comment:
Although it may not have been possible prior to the first release of a test to study the
question of differential performance and item bias for some groups, continued operational
use of a test will often afford opportunities to check for group differences in test perform-
ance and to investigate whether or not these differences indicate test bias.
25. UNIFORM GuIDELINEs, supra note 18, § 3B, 29 C.F.R. § 1607.3B.
26. Id. at § 4D, 29 C.F.R. § 1607.4D.
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B. Content Validation
Criterion validation assumes the existence of a valid criterion (e.g., job
performance) with which the predictor measure (e.g., selection test) can be
correlated and thereby validated. Absent a valid criterion, there is no possi-
bility of showing criterion validity. A valid criterion may not exist because
the only available criteria are biased (e.g., subjective job performance mea-
sured by possibly biased supervisors) or because no acceptable criterion
measure is available. The unavailability of valid criteria is common-place;
with regard to licensing tests that unavailability is all but universal." Nev-
ertheless, each year thousands of prospective lawyers must take a bar exam-
ination, and thousands of aspiring insurance agents must take a licensing
examination, notwithstanding the absence of any valid criteria for job per-
formance. It is simply taken for granted that the tests predict who will and
who will not perform adequately on the job.
Psychometricians in and out of the testing industry have devised an-
other validation strategy, content validation, which is not dependent upon
the existence of a valid criterion measure. Some psychometricians and psy-
chologists, however, have expressed grave reservations about the entire con-
cept of content validation.28 Nevertheless, the paucity of criterion measures
has created a perceived need for an alternative to criterion validation as a
method of validation, and test producers have relied heavily on the content
validation theory.
The APA Standards define content validity as the correspondence be-
tween the content domain of a test and the purpose of the test.2 9 Content
domain is defined as "[a] body of knowledge, skills, and abilities defined so
that items of knowledge or particular tasks can be clearly identified as in-
cluded or excluded from the domain.""0 The Uniform Guidelines are some-
what more restrictive in stating that content validity is inappropriate for
27. APA Standards, supra note 17, Part II, 10-11.
28. Adoption of Questions and Answers to Clarify and Provide a Common Interpreta-
tion of the Uniform Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures, 44 Fed. Reg. 11996, Ques-
tion No. 54 (1979).
29. As set forth in the Glossary of the APA Standards, content-related evidence of
validity is:
evidence that shows the extent to which the content domain of a test is appropriate rela-
tive to its intended purpose. Such evidence is used to establish that the test includes a
representative or critical sample of the relevant content domain and that it excludes con-
tent outside that domain. In employment selection testing, the content domain consists of
tasks, knowledge, skills, and abilities associated with a job. In educational achievement
testing, the content domain refers to the content of the curriculum, the actual instruc-
tions, or the objectives of the instruction.
APA Standards, supra note 17, Glossary at 90.
30. Id.
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tests which purport to measure psychological traits or constructs."' Test de-
velopers seek to assure content validity by the procedures they use in con-
structing tests.
C. Test Construction
Ideally, to be consistent with the content validation model, constructing
a test should involve: (1) conducting a job or task analysis; (2) identifying
the job or task elements in terms of knowledge, skills, and abilities required
by the job or task; (3) constructing test questions designed to measure the
knowledge, skills, and abilities at the levels of proficiency required by the
job or task; (4) reviewing the test questions for apparent lack of clarity,
inaccuracies, and facial ethnic, racial or gender bias; (5) pretesting the ex-
amination on a sample of people to obtain data for analyses to detect signs
of any such inadequacies or defects; and (6) assembling test forms for ad-
ministration to future candidates. The process is inherently never-ending, if
only because new test forms must be devised to reflect job changes and
because the content of the test becomes known to test takers through
breaches in security or systematic assembly of information by test prepara-
tory course entrepreneurs or word-of-mouth reports by past candidates.
For purposes of content validation, a job analysis is conducted by actu-
ally observing work behaviors, interviewing job incumbents or supervisors,
having job incumbents or supervisors fill out questionnaires, or convening
discussion panels of job incumbents or their superiors.3 2 The results are cat-
egorized and organized into job elements from which more macroscopic
knowledge, skills and abilities can be identified, usually by a panel or panels
of experts (job incumbents, former job holders, and supervisors) working
with the job analyst or test developer.
The test developer typically then either convenes other experts who,
after a brief instruction in question writing, draft questions, or requests ex-
perts in question writing to construct questions based upon the previously-
determined knowledge, skills, and abilities associated with the job. In long-
established testing programs, questions may be pulled from pools previously
categorized by content.
31. The Uniform Guidelines provide:
A selection procedure based upon inferences about mental processes cannot be sup-
ported solely or primarily on the basis of content validity. Thus, content strategy is not
appropriate for demonstrating the validity of selection procedures which purport to mea-
sure traits or constructs, such as intelligence, aptitude, personality, commonsense, judg-
ment, leadership, and spatial ability. Content validity is also not an appropriate strategy
when the selection procedure involves knowledges, skills, or abilities which an employee
will be expected to learn on the job.
UNIFORM GUIDELINES, supra note 18, § 14 C (1), 29 C.F.R. § 1607.14C.
32. S. BEMIS, A. BELENKY & D. SODER, JoB ANALYSIS (1983).
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Following assembly, prospective test questions are reviewed by an ex-
pert panel for clarity and accuracy in order to ensure that for each question
there is one and only one "correct" answer. Some test developers also con-
vene a panel of diverse membership to analyze the questions for fairness
and sensitivity. Such a panel permits the test developer to claim that its
tests are reviewed for bias by members of different racial-ethnic groups of
both genders. In practice, a "sensitivity review" relies on a most subjective
measurement-each individual's opinion of what aspects of a test item
might be offensive, unfair, or biased.
The assembled questions should then be administered to a try-out or
pre-test sample. Although pre-testing is not always conducted even in large
testing programs, there is general agreement that it is desirable.33 A pre-
test is the first opportunity to generate what are called "item analyses" or
"item statistics." Additionally, the pre-test is the first opportunity to mea-
sure the test's possible adverse impact on specific gender or racial groups.
D. Item Analysis
After administering a test or pre-test, test developers subject the ques-
tions to an item analysis. An item analysis produces both statistics describ-
ing the response to each question separately and statistics regarding the
relationship between responses to each individual question and responses to
other questions. The other questions may be considered individually, aggre-
gated as subscores, or aggregated as a total test score.
During the item analysis process, an item strip is generated for each
question. The item strip records the number of persons and the percentage
selecting each response alternative, as well as the number and percentage
omitting an answer to the question (double answers generally being counted
as omissions). Usually, the correct answer to the item is noted so that the
percentage of test takers who answered the question correctly is readily as-
certainable. Some item analyses also contain an additional index of item
difficulty in the form of a standardized score calculated with reference to
performance on other items of the test or performance on a set of items
contained within another test form to which the current test is being
equated. The typical item strip gives at least one correlation coefficient,
measuring the relationship between performance on the particular item and
performance on a larger set of items, usually performance on the total set
of test items.
The correlation coefficient r is important because it measures a test's
internal consistency. If a test is homogeneous in content, performance on
33. See, e.g., ETS Standards For Quality & Fairness (1983), Tests & Measure-
ment-Technical Quality of Tests, Guideline 7 at 12.
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each item should be positively related to performance on each other item,
and therefore performance on each item is related to performance on the
test as a whole. If the test contains definable parts within which the items
are homogeneous in content, performance on each item should be positively
related to performance on the part of the test to which that item belongs.
Generally, the greater the positive correlation with an appropriate aggre-
gate score, the "better" the item; a negative correlation is an indication that
an item, if not defective, is at least measuring something not consistent with
the overall purpose of the test.
As a general rule, items whose correlation coefficients are below 0.3
are not considered "good" items.34 Such items whose correlation coefficients
are less than the benchmark or are negative may be flagged for review in
order to determine if they are ambiguously worded or actually miskeyed
with respect to the correct answer. Benchmarks are only general guideposts,
and psychometricians are loath to adopt strict, inflexible standards for eval-
uating the quality of items. On the one hand, this failure to state precise
decisional rules is a consequence of the fact that tests differ in their homo-
geneity and, therefore, in the expected values of r. On the other hand, the
failure to state precise decisional rules reduces the analysis to a subjective
exercise without an ascertainable standard for evaluating test quality, relia-
bility, or validity.
Psychometricians view their item analyses as data for human judg-
ment. But human judgment may serve as a mask behind which the failure
to state a precise standard is hidden. Specifically, once an item is flagged,
assuming a stated rule or rules for flagging, it is not clear whether there
should be affirmative evidence for retaining the item or simply an absence
of additional negative evidence for discarding it. Psychometricians do not
state what presumptions are raised by, or what rules of persuasion apply to,
items flagged by statistical criteria.
E. Item Analysis and Test Bias
There is widespread agreement that large positive item-test correla-
tions are desirable, even if they are often excusably unattainable.3 5 This
consensus has potentially serious consequences. Consider the following ex-
ample: Two groups of people, A and B, take a test. The individuals within
each group differ from one another on the characteristic purportedly being
measured. The test consists of 100 items, 80 of which accurately measure
the characteristic under study, and 20 of which, in addition to measuring
the characteristic within each group, are biased in favor of group A and
34. See, e.g., R. Green, CTB/McGraw-Hill, Comprehensive Test of Basic Skills:
Technical Bulletin No. 2 (1977).
35. See, e.g., A. ANASTASI, PSYCHOLOGICAL TESTING 211 (6th ed. 1988).
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against group B. Assume that both groups have the same mean score on the
80 items. Obviously then, group A will outperform group B on the 100-item
test which includes performance on the 20-item biased set. An item analysis
for all test takers (ignoring A and B group membership) would show that
the item-test correlation coefficients would tend to be highest for the 20
items in the biased set. This must be true because total scores are the sum
of biased scores and unbiased scores, and only the biased items contain both
the biased component and the characteristic being measured by all of the
items. The correlation coefficients would be larger if group A was also supe-
rior to group B on the characteristic purportedly being measured.
The consequence is that the 20 biased items would be preferred for
reuse, or (if the item analysis is part of a pre-test) those items would be
chosen in preference to other items when the time came to construct new
test forms. As successive generations of new forms were developed using
item-test correlation coefficients based upon the entire population of test
takers (ignoring group membership), the test would become progressively
more biased in favor of group A over group B. If there were any basis for
expecting group A to have a higher mean performance than group B, the
entire difference between the groups could be attributed to that cause, even
though much or all of the group difference observed would actually be at-
tributable to biased items. Furthermore, new items which might be biased
in favor of group B would not be used in current forms or reused in subse-
quent forms because they would have smaller item-test correlation coeffi-
cients. The test bias would perpetuate and enhance itself.
F. The Limits to Traditional Methods of Detecting Bias
Traditional psychometric methods designed to detect and measure item
bias are all based upon a common methodology of conducting item analyses
for separate groups of examinees rather than conducting one item analysis
for the entire population of test takers. More precisely, the available psy-
chometric measures of item bias do not measure item bias per se but only
item bias relative to overall test bias. These methodologies can only detect
whether a particular item is significantly more biased or significantly less
biased than the aggregate of all the test items as a whole.
In practice, one cannot ascertain whether a test as a whole is biased
without a criterion measure of known unbiased validity to which the test
may be compared as a whole. Needless to say, if such a criterion existed,
one would not rely upon content validation because criterion validation al-
ready would have been attempted. In reality there is no way, using tradi-
tional methods, to demonstrate that a content-validated test as a whole is
unbiased. Conversely, there is no way to demonstrate that items other than
the significantly deviant items are either biased or unbiased. Purging a con-
tent-validated test of its significantly deviant items only serves to make the
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test more homogeneous with regard to bias, but not demonstratively biased
or unbiased. The test as a whole is the standard against which individual
items are judged, and discarding individual items which are flagged as devi-
ant only makes a relatively minor adjustment to the self-justification of that
standard. A heterogeneously distributed set of test items would be reduced
in the range of its bias, but the mean bias would be little altered whether
the mean is zero or large. A homogeneously biased set of test items would
be unaltered in any way.
Even assuming that these traditional methods identify and flag for re-
view items which may be biased, the review of such items is necessarily
subjective: it consists of evaluating linguistic content and considering possi-
ble cultural explanations for the item behavior. There is no consensus re-
garding the standards for such a review. Alternatively, a scatter diagram
could be constructed in which each test item is represented by a point nu-
merically specified on one axis by the percentage of White candidates an-
swering correctly and on the other axis by the percentage of Black candi-
dates answering correctly. Deviant items could be identified as points which
lie further than a specified number of standard deviations from the regres-
sion line, and all such items could be discarded.
Such a strict procedure is not employed and, even if it were, the selec-
tion of a replacement item would still remain subject to judgment. Human
judgment would be the final determinant of the item content of the exami-
nation. No matter what procedure is employed to deal with flagged items,
the remainder of the items-the items which lie proximate to the regression
line-are implicitly accepted as having passed the bias test.
The existing statistical methods for detecting item bias are relative
methods. They are restricted to comparing the bias of a particular test item
to the bias of a part of the test or the whole test.3 8 Such is the unsatisfac-
tory state of the psychometrician's art, affording small comfort to those
36. As one authority has observed:
All statistical procedures devised to date are "relative" methods. The present concep-
tualizations of bias in an item involve its "not fitting in" with some other group of items
with which it had been thought to belong. This is true whether one uses matched or
random samples and whether one uses internal or external criteria of ability. Thus bias is
not necessarily some inherently "bad" characteristic of an item; it is dependent on the
pool of items with which the particular item is being compared. In this respect, then, bias
in the sense of unfairness to some group cannot be eliminated during test construction by
rejecting items that do not meet a particular standard of comparability with other items.
What the process can do is to improve the homogeneity of the test being constructed so
that each item is yielding information parallel to that yielded by each other item. The
final test must then be evaluated for fairness or bias in terms of the use to which test
scores are put in decision making.
L. Burrill, Comparative Studies of Item Bias Methods, in BERK, supra note 19, at 173-74
(emphasis in original).
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concerned with racial bias in occupational testing.
III. STATUTORY AND CONSTITUTIONAL STANDARDS
Two sources of federal law are available to those injured by racial bias
in testing: Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 3 and the Fourteenth
Amendment. 8 Neither is particularly satisfactory, since courts, like
psychometricians, are still groping. There are unresolved questions regard-
ing the extent to which Title VII applies to licensing or to test developers.
Likewise, the constitutional issues are unsettled: it is unclear to what degree
the equal protection and due process clauses provide effective bases for at-
tacking racial bias in testing. The result is that individuals adversely af-
fected by test bias face formidable obstacles in court.
A. Title VII
Title VII prohibits employers from failing or refusing to hire any indi-
vidual or discriminating "against any individual with respect to his compen-
sation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such indi-
vidual's race, color. . . .or national origin. . . . ,,3 Title VII contains the
following caveat, however:
• .. nor shall it be an unlawful employment practice for an
employer to give and act upon the results of any professionally
developed ability tests provided that such test, its administration
or action upon the results is not designed, intended or used to
discriminate because of race, color, religion, sex or national
origin.41
The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), which,
along with other federal agencies, enforces Title VII, issued interpretative
guidelines,41 known as the Uniform Guidelines on Employee Selection Pro-
37. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e.
38. Another basis for challenging licensing requirements, section I of the Sherman Act,
15 U.S.C. § 1, was effectively precluded by the Supreme Court in Hoover v. Ronwin, 466 U.S.
558 (1984). There the Court held that a suit against bar examiners for allegedly conspiring to
limit the number of attorneys admitted to practice was barred by the doctrine of state action
immunity from antitrust liability.
39. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1).
40. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h). It is not a sufficient defense that a test was "professionally
designed or developed" by a "professional" test developer. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401
U.S. 424, 435-36 (1971).
41. The other agencies are the Department of Justice, 28 C.F.R. § 50.14 (1988); the
Office of Personnel Management, 5 C.F.R. § 300.103(C1988); the Office of Federal Contract
Compliance of the Department of Labor, 41 C.F.R. § 60-3 (1988); and the Office of Revenue
Sharing of the Department of Treasury, 31 C.F.R. § 12.101 (1985).
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cedures42 Under the Uniform Guidelines and Supreme Court decisions,43 if
a test or other selection procedure has an "adverse" impact on the basis of
race, sex, or ethnic group"4 the employer must either eliminate the impact
or show that the selection procedure is "job related. ' 45 Job-relatedness is
established if the test has been validated for the purpose for which it is
used.4 Upon a showing of adverse impact, the burden shifts to the defend-
ant to establish job-relatedness.47 Under Title VII, a plaintiff proving ad-
42. See supra note 18.
43. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431 (1971); Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405
(1975).
44. Section 4D of the Uniform Guidelines provides that "[a] selection rate for any
race, sex, or ethnic group which is less than four-fifths (4/5)(or eighty percent) of the rate for
the group with the highest rate will generally be regarded by the Federal enforcement agencies
as evidence of adverse impact." 29 C.F.R. § 1607.4D. Section 4D also includes caveats to this
"four-fifths" rule of thumb with respect to greater and lesser differences and with respect to
statistical significance. The federal agencies regard the "four-fifths" rule as a "rule of
thumb . . .not ... as a legal definition of adverse impact." Adoption of Questions and An-
swers To Clarify and Provide a Common Interpretation of the Uniform Guidelines on Em-
ployee Selection Procedures, supra note 28, Question and Answer No. 11.
Some courts have held that unless differences are statistically significant, there is no bur-
den-shifting adverse impact. See, e.g., Contreras v. City of Los Angeles, 656 F.2d 1267, 1272-
73 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1021 (1982); Williams v. Tallahassee Motors, Inc.,
607 F.2d 689, 693 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 858 (1981). Most courts consider
the "four-fifths" rule along with other evidence as measures of discriminatory effect. See, e.g.,
Guardians Ass'n of the New York City Police Dept., Inc. v. Civil Service Comm., 630 F.2d
79, 88 (2d Cir. 1980)(adverse impact shown "[b]y any reasonable measure, including ... the
four-fifths rule .... ), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 940 (1981); Chrisholm v. United States Postal
Serv., 665 F.2d 482, 495 & nn. 21-22 (4th Cir. 1981)(chi square analysis and four-fifths rule);
League of Martin v. City of Milwaukee, 588 F. Supp. 1004, 1014-15 (E.D. Wis. 1984)(four-
fifths rule and statistical significance); Easley v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 572 F. Supp. 402, 406-
07 (E.D. Mo. 1983)(four-fifths rule and chi square); Burney v. City of Pawtucket, 559 F.
Supp. 1089, 1099 (D.R.I. 1983)(four-fifths rule and other evidence); Berkman v. City of New
York, 536 F. Supp. 177, 205 (E.D.N.Y. 1982)(four-fifths rule and binomial distribution),
a.ffd, 705 F.2d 584 (2d Cir. 1983); I.M.A.G.E. v. Bailar, 518 F. Supp. 800, 804-08 (N.D. Cal.
1981)(same); Reynolds v. Sheet Metal Workers Local 102, 498 F. Supp. 952, 965-70 (D.D.C.
1980)(four-fifths rule, chi square, and binomial distribution), affd, 702 F.2d 221 (D.C. Cir.
1981).
In Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 108 S. Ct. 2777 (1988), a plurality noted criti-
cism of the "four-fifths rule," and asserted that there is no "rigid mathematical formula" for
establishing disparate impact. Four justices opted for a "case-by-case" approach.
45. Uniform Guidelines, supra note 18, §§ 3 & 6, 29 C.F.R. §§ 1607.3 & 1607.6.
46. Id. at § 3A, 29 C.F.R. 1607.3A. The Uniform Guidelines recognize three types of
validation, criterion-related validity studies, content validity studies and construct validity
studies, 29 C.F.R. § 1607.5A, and set forth "technical standards" for each. 29 C.F.R. §
1607.14. In Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 108 S. Ct. 2777 (1988), a plurality said that
it is not necessary "to introduce formal 'validation studies' showing that particular criteria
predict actual on-the-job performance." Id. at 2790.
47. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431; Albemarle Paper Co., 422 U.S. at 425. Instead of refer-
ring to "adverse impact," in Albemarle the Court used the term "significantly different" selec-
tion rates. Id. Recently, a plurality of the Supreme Court has suggested that the plaintiff
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verse impact need not prove intentional discrimination in order to make out
a prima facie case.48
Before a court addresses the merits of a claim of racial discrimination
in occupational testing, it must deal with one or both of two threshold is-
sues: 1) does Title VII apply to licensing examinations? and if so, 2) does it
apply to private test developers such as ETS?
1. Application of Title VII to Licensing
Whether Title VII and the Uniform Guidelines apply to occupational
licensing is unresolved. The Uniform Guidelines purport to "apply to tests
and other selection procedures which are used as a basis for any employ-
ment decision. Employment decisions include but are not limited to hiring,
promotion, demotion, membership (for example, in a labor organization),
referral, [and] retention. . . ." The statement of purpose section of the
Uniform Guidelines, however, contemplates that Title VII does apply to
licensing and certification.5" The Uniform Guidelines' definition of the word
"user" supports this view.51
In determining Title VII's applicability, two EEOC decisions are in-
structive. EEOC Dec. No. 75-2495" held that, inasmuch as a state insur-
ance licensing agency itself employed more than fifteen persons and was
therefore subject to the jurisdiction of Title VII, the agency was answerable
to charges that it discriminated on the basis of national origin by adminis-
tering its insurance examination in English only. The Commission reasoned:
By its terms Title VII speaks not of "employees" but of "per-
son[s] aggrieved-." Throughout the Title and its legislative his-
tory Congress indicated its intent to deal with more than the
retains the burden throughout a "disparate impact" case. Watson v. Fort Worth Bank &
Trust, 108 S. Ct. 2777 (1988).
48. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 247-48 (1976).
49. Uniform Guidelines, supra note 18, § 2B, 29 C.F.R. § 1607.2B.
50. The Uniform Guidelines state: "These guidelines incorporate a single set of princi-
ples which are designed to assist employers, labor organizations, employment agencies, and
licensing and certification boards to comply with requirements of Federal law prohibiting em-
ployment practices which discriminate on grounds of race, color, religion, sex, and national
origin." Id. at § 1B, 29 C.F.R. § 1607.1B (emphasis added).
51. The Uniform Guidelines provide:
Whenever an employer, labor organization, or employment agency is required by law to
restrict recruitment for any occupation to those applicants who have met licensing or
certification requirements, the licensing or certifying authority to the extent it may be
covered by Federal equal employment opportunity law will be considered the user with
respect to those licensing or certification requirements.
Id. at § 16W, 29 C.F.R. § 1607.16W.
52. National Origin Bias Found in Use of State Insurance Licensing Exam, EEOC
Decs. (CCH) 1 6457 (May 6, 1975).
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conventional employer-employee situation as demonstrated by
the specific prohibition against discrimination by employment
agencies and referral labor organizations. . .Courts have held
that no employer-employee relationship need exist, only control
over access to the job market and denial of such access by refer-
ence to invidious criteria."
In EEOC Dec. No. 81-22,5 the Commission found that a state police
department which served as a licensing agency for private security guards
was subject to Title VII.55 In addition to relying on statutory language, the
Commission also relied on the remedial purposes of Title VII, stating that
"[a] proper test of the Commission's jurisdiction over the subject-mat-
ter. . . focuses on whether the Respondent acted in a manner or made a
decision which adversely affected the Charging Party and allegedly de-
prived him of a right protected. . by the Act."
Although the Supreme Court in Griggs v. Duke Power Co.58 stated
that the EEOC's construction of Title VII is entitled to "great deference,"
the courts have not been particularly deferential.57 Some courts have con-
53. Id. at 4208.
54. State Licensing Agency Accountable For Job Opportunity Denial, EEOC Decs.
(CCH) 6825 (May 13, 1981).
55. The EEOC explained:
That Title VII is designed to cover more than the conventional employer-employee rela-
tionship has been recognized by numerous court cases and Commission decisions.. .Se-
tion 706(b) requires only that the charge be filed by or on behalf of "a person claiming to
be aggrieved." The Charging Party is definitely aggrieved by the Respondent's disap-
proval of his application of a uniformed guard position if the processing of the application
was conducted in a manner which discriminated against him because of his race. The
disapproval of the application necessarily means that a private detective agency must by
law refuse to employ or continue to employ an individual who does not obtain the Re-
spondent's approval.
Id. at 4951 (footnote omitted).
56. 401 U.S. 424, 433-34 (1971).
57. George v. New Jersey Bd. of Veterinary Medical Examiners, 794 F.2d 113 (3d Cir.
1986); Haddock v. Bd. of Dental Examiners of California, 777 F.2d 462 (9th Cir. 1985)(state
board of dental examiners is not an "employer"); EEOC v. Waterfront Comm'n, 665 F. Supp.
197 (S.D.N.Y. 1987); Lavender-Cabellero v. Dep't of Consumer Affairs, 458 F. Supp. 213,
215 (S.D.N.Y. 1978)(Title VII does not apply to a city agency in the exercise of its statutory
mandate to issue licenses to process servers, finding the absence of explicit treatment of licens-
ing by Congress to be persuasive). Cf. Beverly v. Douglas, 591 F. Supp. 1321 (S.D.N.Y.
1984)(Title VII does not apply to a hospital which denied the plaintiff's application for volun-
tary attending privileges); Darks v. City of Cincinnati, 745 F.2d 1040, 1043 (6th Cir.
1984)(Title VII does not apply to a city agency which denied the plaintiff a license to operate
a dance hall).
Dictum in some cases also indicates a narrow view of the application of Title VII to
licensing. See Darks, 745 F.2d at 1042 n.3; Tyler v. Vickery, 517 F.2d 1089, 1096 (5th Cir.
1975) (court rejected contention that bar examination was unconstitutional because it was not
validated pursuant to EEOC Guidelines; the court stated that "Title VII does not apply by its
Shapiro et al.: Minimizing Unnecessary Differences in Occupational Testing
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1989
232 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 23
strued Title VII's definition of "employer" narrowly, holding that a govern-
ment agency which licenses individuals is not an employer; thus Woodward
v. Virginia Board of Bar Examiners" held that Title VII was inapplicable
to professional licensing examinations. Similarly, National Organization for
Women v. Waterfront Commission59 held that Title VII did not apply to a
commission which licensed and registered persons working on the New
York waterfront. The court reasoned that Congress must have considered
and rejected the application of Title VII to licensing.6"
On the other hand, some courts have held that Title VII does reach
licensing. Sibley Memorial Hospital v. Wilson,6 while not directly involv-
ing licensing, articulates the more expansive view. A male private duty
nurse licensed to practice in the District of Columbia alleged that the hospi-
tal discriminatorily denied him referrals to female patients on the basis of
his sex, under a program whereby the hospital referred independent private
duty nurses to patients. The court of appeals reversed the district court's
summary judgment for the hospital, emphasizing that the objective of Title
VII was "to achieve equality of employment opportunities"62 and that this
broad remedial purpose was best served by applying the Act's prohibitions
to the hospital:
Control over access to the job market may reside, depending
upon the circumstances of the case, in a labor organization, an
employment agency, or an employer as defined in Title VII; and
it would appear that Congress has determined to prohibit each
of these from exerting any power it may have to foreclose, on
invidious grounds, access by any individual to employment op-
portunities otherwise available to him.6"
terms, of course, because the Georgia Board of Bar Examiners is neither an 'employer,' or
'employment agency,' nor a 'labor organization' within the meaning of the statute."), cert.
denied, 426 U.S. 940 (1976); Richardson v. McFadden, 540 F.2d 744, 747 (4th Cir. 1976)
("Appellants agree that Title VII does not apply to the bar exam by its own terms."), rehear-
ing en banc, 563 F.2d 1130 (4th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 968 (1978).
58. 420 F. Supp. 211 (E.D. Va. 1976), arid per curiam, 598 F.2d 1345 (4th Cir.
1979).
59. 468 F. Supp. 317 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
60. The court said:
In its licensing role, the Commission neither pays the wages nor engages the services of
persons it registers. Nor does it undertake to obtain workers for employers or jobs for
workers. It is, therefore, neither an "employer" nor an "employment agency" with re-
spect to persons desiring registration.
Id. at 320.
61. 488 F.2d 1338 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
62. Id. at 1340-41 (quoting Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1970)).
63. Id. at 1341 (emphasis added). Sibley has been reaffirmed in Doe v. St. Joseph's
Hosp. of Fort Wayne, 788 F.2d 411, 422 (7th Cir. 1986). The Doe court reversed the dismissal
of a Title VII case brought by a physician against a hospital. Denying staff-privileges, the
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The principle announced in Sibley was applied to licensing in Puntolillo v.
New Hampshire Racing Commission." The Puntolillo court held that be-
cause defendants were employers under the Act and controlled plaintiff's
access to his job, they were subject to the requirements of Title VII. 65
Although the authorities are plainly divided, and the Supreme Court
has yet to resolve the division, the statute's remedial purposes surely favor
the broader reading of Title VII. That interpretation is particularly appro-
court ruled, could constitute interference with the physician's employment opportunities with
her patients within the meaning of Title VII. See also Pardazi v. Cullman Medical Center,
838 F.2d 1155 (11th Cir. 1988); Zaklama v. Mt. Sinai Medical Center, 842 F.2d 291, 293-95
(11th Cir. 1988). But see Diggs v. Harris Hosp.-Methodist, Inc., 847 F.2d 270 (5th Cir.
1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 394 (1988).
64. 375 F. Supp. 1089 (D.N.H. 1974). A driver-trainer of harness horses alleged that
defendants (the commission and a racing association which held races at a particular track)
discriminatorily denied him a racing license on the basis of his national origin. The court
denied motions to dismiss, holding that both defendants were "employers" within the meaning
of Title VII. Admitting that the relationship was not a traditional employer-employee relation-
ship, the court emphasized the Act's broad remedial objectives. Quoting from Griggs, the court
stated that the purpose of the Act was to "achieve equality of employment opportunities and
remove barriers that operated in the past." Id. at 1092 (emphasis by court).
65. Id. at 1092. Similarly in Veizaga v. National Bd. for Respiratory Therapy, 21 Fair
Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 246 (N.D. Ill. 1977), plaintiffs alleged that defendants, who partici-
pated in the registration or certification of respiratory therapists, violated Title VII by requir-
ing persons seeking employment as respiratory therapists to pass certain examinations; hospi-
tals relied on this accreditation procedure in hiring. While holding that the facts were
insufficient to state a claim, the court permitted plaintiffs to amend "to allege with more speci-
ficity the manner in which NBRT controls access to employment. This should refer to some
type of licensing, screening or channeling function which is a prerequisite to employment in
various hospitals." Id. (emphasis added). The Sibley principle has been applied to civil service
agencies that do not themselves employ workers. See infra notes 66-69. The principle also has
been applied in other contexts as well. See Gomez v. Alexian Bros. Hosp. of San Jose, 698
F.2d 1019 (9th Cir. 1983)(applying Title VII to hospital which denied application of plaintiff's
medical corporation for contract to oversee hospital's emergency room); Barone v. Hackett,
602 F. Supp. 481 (D.R.I. 1984)(applying Title VII to officials of employee benefits programs
which allegedly discriminated in providing pregnancy benefits); Pao v. Holy Redeemer Hosp.,
547 F. Supp. 484, 494 (E.D. Pa. 1982)(applying Title VII to hospital which denied plaintiff's
application for staff privileges, where plaintiff alleged that "the defendant significantly affected
or controlled his access to other employment opportunities in a discriminatory manner.");
EEOC v. Sage Realty Corp., 87 F.R.D. 365, 370 (S.D.N.Y. 1980)(finding two companies to
be a joint employer because the term "employer" has been construed "in a functional sense to
encompass persons who are not employers in conventional terms, but who nevertheless control
some aspect of an individual's compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment.");
Naismith v. Professional Golfers Assn., 85 F.R.D. 552, 557-61 (N.D. Ga. 1979)(applying Title
VII to professional golfers' association which organized events for professional golfers); Van-
guard Justice Soc'y, Inc. v. Hughes, 471 F. Supp. 670, 694-97 (D. Md. 1979)(applying Title
VII to state in lawsuit concerning employment practices of city police department); Curran v.
Portland Superintending School Comm., 435 F. Supp. 1063, 1073 (D. Me. 1977)(applying
Title VII to city by reason of its role in appropriating funds for school system, on grounds that
"the City is sufficiently involved in, and, in fact, necessary to, the total employment process
that it must be considered plaintiffs employer for purposes of jurisdiction under Title VII.").
Shapiro et al.: Minimizing Unnecessary Differences in Occupational Testing
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1989
234 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 23
priate in light of the significance of licensing in determining access to job
opportunities. In many occupations, being licensed is the sine qua non of
being employed. As noted in Sibley, as a practical matter, licensing controls
access to the job market. Since Congress intended to eradicate invidious
restraints on access to jobs, applying Title VII to licensing furthers Con-
gress' remedial intent.
2. Application of Title VII to Test Developers
Beyond the question of whether Title VII applies to licensing, a second
issue arises as to whether, in addition to government agency users of tests,
private test developers are covered by Title VII. There are at least sugges-
tions that they are. United States v. City of Yonkers6 held that the New
York State Civil Service Commission was a proper defendant under Title
VII where the Commission developed civil service tests used for appoint-
ments and promotions by the state and municipalities.6 7 In Vanguard Jus-
tice Society v. Hughes,6 8 the court held that a civil service commission
which "exercised substantial authority and discretion in the area of testing
of applicants for entry level positions with the [Police] Department" was an
"employer" within the meaning of Title VII.69 Other cases have decided, on
an agency theory, that Title VII applies to civil service commissions in con-
texts other than testing.70 There does not appear to be any direct holding,
however, that a private test developer is an "employer" or an "employment
agency" under Title VII.
B. Constitutional Protections
For the equal protection and due process provisions of the Fourteenth
Amendment to apply, the conduct in question must constitute "state ac-
66. 592 F. Supp. 570 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
67. Id. at 591. To the same effect is Vulcan Soc'y v. Fire Dept., 82 F.R.D. 379, 395-96
(S.D.N.Y. 1979)(state civil commission is subject to Title VII to the extent it prepared the test
used in connection with municipal hiring).
68. 471 F. Supp. 670, 696-97 (D. Md. 1979).
69. Id. at 696. Other cases have held that Title VII applies to civil service commissions
in contexts other than testing. See, e.g., Williams v. City of Montgomery, 742 F.2d 586, 588-
89 (1 lth Cir. 1984)(Title VII applies to city personnel board since it exercises functions "tra-
ditionally exercised by an employer"), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1053 (1985); Cannon v. State of
Delaware, 523 F. Supp. 341, 344 (D. Del. 1981)(Title VII applies to state personnel
commission).
70. A leading text states that "[Wlhere the employer had delegated control of some of
the employer's traditional rights, such as hiring or firing, to a third party, the third party has
been found to be an "employer" by virtue of the agency relationship." B. SCHLEI & P. GROSS-
MAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW at 1002 (2d ed. 1983) (footnote omitted) [hereinaf-
ter B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN].
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tion," since private acts are not proscribed. 1 While a state licensing agency
is clearly engaged in state action,72 it is uncertainwhether a private test
developer of a licensing test is also subject to constitutional scrutiny.
1. State Action
The Supreme Court has repeatedly stated that the issue of state action
is fact-dependent,73 and in analyzing the relevant facts it has suggested sev-
eral approaches.74 Of particular significance to occupational testing is the
"public function" analysis. In Evans v. Newton7 5 the Court held that the
actions of private trustees appointed to administer a racially segregated
park constituted state action because "the tradition of municipal control
had become firmly established.176 More recently the Court explained that
to be treated as a state actor a nominally private party must exercise a
power which is "traditionally the exclusive prerogative of the State. 77 A
wide variety of functions has been characterized as traditionally govern-
mental, including law enforcement,7 8 fire protection,7 evaluation of judicial
candidates, 80 and administering a local library.81
71. Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 837 (1982); Shelly v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1,
13 (1948).
72. See generally 51 AM. JUR. 2D Licenses & Permits § 14 (2d ed. 1970).
73. See, e.g., Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 722 (1961).
74. See, e.g., Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948); Burton v. Wilmington Parking
Auth., 365 U.S. 715 (1961); Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296 (1966); Jackson v. Metropolitan
Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974); Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149 (1978); Rendell-
Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830 (1982); Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991 (1982); Lugar v. Ed-
mondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922 (1982).
75. 382 U.S. 296 (1966).
76. Id. at 301.
77. Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 353 (1974)(the function must
be exclusively a state function); Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 842 (1982)(although
special education for "maladjusted high school students is a public function," it is not "the
exclusive province of the state"); Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1012 (1982)("decisions
made in day-to-day administration of a nursing home" are not "the kind of decisions tradition-
ally and exclusively made by the sovereign for and on behalf of the public."); Watkins v. Reed,
557 F. Supp. 278, 281-82 (E.D. Ky. 1983), affid, 734 F.2d 17 (6th Cir. 1984); Avallone v.
Wilmington Medical Center, Inc., 553 F. Supp. 931, 934 (D. Del. 1982); Spencer v. General
Tel. Co., 551 F. Supp. 896, 898 (M.D. Pa. 1982). See also Hodges v. Metts, 676 F.2d 1133,
1137 (6th Cir. 1982); Newsom v. Vanderbilt Univ., 653 F.2d 1100, 1114 (6th Cir. 1981);
Musso v. Suriano, 586 F.2d 59, 63 (7th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 971 (1979); Lowell
v. Wantz, 85 F.R.D. 286, 288 (E.D. Pa. 1980), affid, 636 F.2d 1209 (3d Cir. 1980). It is thus
not enough that a party's activity be affected with a public interest. See Gerena v. Puerto Rico
Legal Servs., Inc., 697 F.2d 447, 451 (Ist Cir. 1983); Nguyen v. United States Catholic Con-
ference, 548 F. Supp. 1333, 1344 (W.D. Pa. 1982), affd, 719 F.2d 52 (3d Cir. 1983). See also
Bloomer Shippers Ass'n v. Illinois Central Gulf R.R., 655 F.2d 772, 776 (7th Cir. 1981).
78. Henderson v. Fisher, 631 F.2d 1115, 1118 (3d Cir. 1980).
79. Janusaitis v. Middlebury Volunteer Fire Dept., 607 F.2d 17, 22-25 (2d Cir. 1979).
80. Rouse v. Judges of Circuit Ct. of Cook County, 609 F. Supp. 243, 247 (N.D. Ill.
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Occupational licensing is traditionally an exclusive state function. 2
Where a private firm develops a test which is an essential part of the licens-
ing process, its conduct logically should constitute state action subject to
due process and equal protection limitations. In the Golden Rule case83 the
Illinois Appellate Court reversed the lower court's dismissal, holding that,
as alleged, the "[Illinois Insurance] Director and ETS have been inelucta-
bly intertwined .... "8 The court noted the substantial nature of the tasks
performed by ETS in the licensing process.8 5 Furthermore, the court found
that passing the ETS-prepared test was the "sine qua non of the ability to
engage in the insurance agent or broker business in the very first in-
stance. 81 6 ETS has also been held to be subject to the due process clause
1985).
81. Chalfant v. Wilmington Inst., 574 F.2d 739 (3d Cir. 1978). Other functions have
been held not to be public. See, e.g., Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974);
Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149 (1978). At one time, the Supreme Court appeared
willing to embrace a broader view of state action, stating that "[ilt is enough that he [the
alleged wrongdoer] is a willful participant in joint activity with the State or its agents."
Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 152 (1970)(state action by private restaurant if it
is shown that restaurant employee reached "an understanding" with police officer to refuse to
serve plaintiff or to cause her subsequent arrest)(quoting United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787,
794 (1966)).
See Fitzgerald v. Mountain Laurel Racing, Inc., 607 F.2d 589 (3d Cir. 1979), cert. de-
nied, 446 U.S. 956 (1980), where the court first concluded that there was not a "symbiotic
relationship," as defined in Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715 (1961), be-
tween the state and a private racing association so that "every act of [the association] is an act
of the State." The court then held, however, that there was state action in light of the "nexus"
between the association's particular actions and the state, within the meaning of Jackson v.
Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974). 607 F.2d at 597-600. See also Kissinger v.
New York City Transit Auth., 274 F. Supp. 438, 441 (S.D.N.Y. 1967) (advertising firm under
contract with transit authority subject to first and fourteenth amendments).
82. See generally 51 AM. JUR. 2D Licenses & Permits § 14 (2d ed. 1970).
83. Golden Rule Life Ins. Co. v. Mathias, 86 Ill. App. 3d 323, 408 N.E.2d 310 (1980).
84. Id. at 330, 408 N.E.2d at 316.
85. Id. The court noted that under the contract between ETS and the Director, ETS
performed the following functions: (1) developed the examination in accordance with specifica-
tions developed by ETS; (2) retained complete control over the examination, including owner-
ship of the copyright, and physical control over printed copies of the examination; (3) printed
the examination, established testing centers and provided personnel to administer the examina-
tion; (4) processed all applications of those who desired to take the examination and become
licensed; (5) graded all examinations and determined who has passed; and (6) printed the
State licenses for the Director.
86. Id. at 331, 408 N.E.2d at 316. The court distinguished another case, Stewart v.
Hannon, 469 F. Supp. 1142 (N.D. Il1. 1979), where passing an examination used to determine
eligibility did not assure appointment to the position of school principal. Id.
While ETS's involvement in the licensing process in Golden Rule was more substantial
than its involvement with the selection of principals in Stewart by virtue of the relative signifi-
cance of the examination in the two processes, the court in Stewart misapplied the state action
doctrine because the test at issue there was more than a significant part of the process-it was
the principal means of selection. Failure to pass the test was a conclusive bar for those seeking
to become principals. Cf. Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440 (1982) (employer liable under
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where it acted as the agent of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania in devel-
oping and administering its multistate real estate licensing examination.87
The Supreme Court's most recent state action decision does not resolve
the issue. In National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Tarkanian,8 8 the Su-
preme Court held that the NCAA's actions leading to a state university's
suspension of an intercollegiate athletic coach did not constitute state ac-
tion. The majority identified two analytically distinct contexts in which the
"state action" issue arises. "In the typical case," said the Court, ". . . . a
private party has taken the decisive step that caused the harm to the plain-
tiff... "89 The question there is "whether the State was sufficiently in-
volved to treat that decisive conduct as state action."90 According to the
majority, the case before it presented the other, non-typical, analytical con-
text in which the "state action" issue arises: where the private party partici-
pated in the challenged conduct, but the state itself took the "decisive
step." ' 1 The majority concluded that the NCAA was not controlled by a
state and that the state university's decision to adopt the NCAA's stan-
dards or procedures did not render the NCAA a state actor.92 Finally, while
acknowledging that a private party may become a state actor by virtue of a
state's delegation of state authority, 93 the majority found that the state had
not delegated authority to the NCAA; rather the NCAA and the state uni-
"994versity"... acted much more like adversaries than like partners ... .
Title VII for racial discrimination with respect to written test even where other factors in
promotion process compensate for discriminatory impact of test). Having been delegated sub-
stantial responsibility for the test, ETS's conduct should have been deemed state action. Imme-
diately after plaintiffs filed their notice of appeal, defendants adopted a formal resolution not
to use the results of the examination, thereby rendering the appeal moot. See Stewart v. Han-
non, 675 F.2d 846, 848 (7th Cir. 1982).
87. Martin v. Educational Testing Serv., Inc., 179 N.J. Super. 317, 431 A.2d 868
(1981). However, educational admissions tests have been held to be beyond the reach of con-
stitutional limitations. See, e.g., Johnson v. Educational Testing Serv., 754 F.2d 20 (Ist Cir.
1985), cert. denied, 472 U.S. 1029 (1985). The Johnson court distinguished the Golden Rule
and Martin cases, noting that its ruling "is not to say that ETS can never be a state actor
engaging in state action." 754 F.2d at 25 n.2. On the other hand, discrimination in connection
with state scholarship awards based solely on SAT scores is constitutionally actionable. See
Sharif v. N.Y. State Educ. Dept., No. 88-CIV-8435 (JMW)(S.D.N.Y. Feb 3, 1989).
88. 109 S. Ct. 454 (1988).
89. Id. at 462.
90. Id. The majority noted three situations where such "decisive conduct" may occur:
(1) if the State creates the legal framework governing the conduct; (2) if the State delegates
its authority to the private actor; or (3) sometimes if the State knowingly accepts the benefits
derived from unconstitutional behavior. Id. at 463-65.
91. Id. at 464.
92. Id. at 462-65.
93. Id. at 464.
94. Id. The majority also noted that the NCAA "enjoyed no governmental powers to
facilitate its investigation." Id. Further, a private party does not become a state actor even
where a". . . private monopolist can impose its will on a state agency by a threatened refusal
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The four dissenting Justices concluded that it was sufficient that the NCAA
and the state university "acted jointly" in suspending the coach.95 They
contended that, in previous decisions, the fact that the state carried out the
final or decisive act had not stood in the way of a finding that a private
entity was a state actor.98
In the typical licensing case, the extent of the powers delegated to a
private test developer surely satisfies the "joint actor" standard of the dis-
sent in NCAA v. Tarkanian. Moreover, the extent of the delegation may be
sufficient to satisfy the more demanding "decisive step" standard, particu-
larly since the majority noted with approval an earlier decision holding that
a private physician who contracted with a state prison to provide care for
inmates was in fact a state actor.97 Significantly, unlike the "adversarial"
relationship stressed by the majority in NCAA v. Tarkanian, the state and
the test developer are true partners in the licensing process. In any event,
the different legal standards articulated by the Court and the fact-depen-
dent nature of the "state action" analysis lead to considerable uncertainty
as to the extent to which constitutional protections apply to private develop-
ers of licensing examinations.
2. Equal Protection
The Supreme Court requires that a plaintiff alleging an equal protec-
tion claim prove intentional discrimination."8 A showing of discriminatory
effect which would suffice under Title VII is insufficient to prove a violation
of the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.99 Neverthe-
less, "[d]isproportional impact is not irrelevant, but it is not the sole touch-
stone of an invidious racial discrimination forbidden by the Constitu-
tion." 100  The Court explained that "[nlecessarily, an invidious
discriminatory purpose may often be inferred from the totality of the rele-
to deal with it .... " Id. at 465. Finally, the majority found that the NCAA's conduct was
not "fairly attributable to the state" because the state opposed the NCAA's sanctions; at most
the state university "conducted its athletic program under color of the policies adopted by the
NCAA, rather than that those policies were developed and enforced under color of Nevada
law." Id. at 465.
95. Id. at 466. The dissent noted that the state university suspended the coach for
violation of NCAA rules pursuant to its agreement with the NCAA. Id. Further, the univer-
sity agreed that the NCAA would conduct the hearings concerning the coach's violation of
NCAA rules. Id. at 466-67. Finally, the university agreed that it would be bound by the
NCAA's findings. Id. at 467.
96. Id. at 466 (citing Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144 (1970) and Dennis v.
Sparks, 449 U.S. 24 (1980)).
97. Id. at 462 (citing West v. Atkins, 108 S. Ct. 2250 (1988)).
98. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976).
99. See, e.g., Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971).
100. 426 U.S. at 242.
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vant facts, including the fact, if it is true, that the law bears more heavily
on one race than another."'' 01
The Court has enumerated factors to be considered in establishing dis-
criminatory intent.102 As the Court has stated: "[d]etermining whether in-
vidious discriminatory purpose was a motivating factor demands a sensitive
inquiry into such circumstantial and direct evidence of intent as may be
available." 03 Discriminatory impact "may provide an important starting
point" 104 and in some cases may be so substantial that, if "unexplainable on
grounds other than race," it may suffice. Also relevant are "[t]he historical
background," "the specific sequence of events leading up to the challenged
decision," "[d]epartures from the normal procedural sequence," "substan-
tive departures," and "[t]he legislative or administrative history."' 05
In Personnel Administrator of Massachusetts v. Feeney,206 the Court
appeared to articulate a stricter view of the proof needed to invalidate a
state statute having a discriminatory effect. There the Court upheld a veter-
ans' preference statute which clearly had a discriminatory impact on
women:
"Discriminatory purpose," however, implies more than intent as
volition or intent as awareness of consequences. It implies that
the decisionmaker, in this case a state legislature, selected or
reaffirmed a particular course of action at least in part "because
of," not merely "in spite of," its adverse effects upon an identifi-
able group.107
But the Court did not reject discriminatory impact as an element of proving
discriminatory intent. Quoting Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropoli-
tan Housing Development, the Court acknowledged not only that "impact
provides an 'important starting point,' "108 but also that "there are cases in
which impact alone can unmask an invidious classification."109 The Court
further explained that "[i]f the impact of this statute could not be plausibly
explained on a neutral ground, impact itself would signal that the real clas-
sification made by the law was in fact not neutral."'110 Further, "[p]roof of
discriminatory impact must necessarily usually rely on objective factors,
101. Id.
102. Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266
(1977).
103. Id. at 266.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 267-68.
106. 442 U.S. 256 (1979).
107. Id. at 279 (footnotes omitted).
108. Id. at 274 (quoting Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 266).
109. Feeney, 442 U.S. at 275.
110. Id.
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several of which were outlined in Village of Arlington Heights .... The
inquiry is practical. What a legislature or any official entity is 'up to' may
be plain from the results its actions achieve, or the results they avoid.""1 In
a testing case, discriminatory impact is a major element of a plaintiff's
proof. The Supreme Court certainly has suggested that extreme disparate
impact may by itself support a finding of discriminatory intent."
The Sixth Circuit has held that "[s]tatistical evidence of racially dis-
parate impact of employment practices alone may establish a statutory vio-
lation. . . .Under some circumstances, such evidence may also demon-
strate a constitutional violation."113 Other federal courts have also
recognized the significance of extreme disparate impact in proving intent.'1 "
Even if discriminatory impact by itself is not sufficient to establish the
requisite intent, the foreseeability of such impact is probative of intent.1 5
111. Id. at 279 n.24. Feeney can also be read as establishing a presumption of discrimi-
natory intent upon a showing of discriminatory effect. The court stated:
This is not to say that the inevitability or foreseeability of consequences of a neutral rule
has no bearing upon the existence of discriminatory intent. Certainly, when the adverse
consequences of a law upon an identifiable group are as inevitable as the gender-based
consequences of [the veterans' preference statute], a strong inference that the adverse
effects were desired can reasonably be drawn.
442 U.S. at 279 n.25. See also Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449 (1979). Thus,
the Court in Feeney in effect held that the presumption of intent had been rebutted by proof of
a non-invidious purpose, and "the inference simply fail[ed] to ripen into proof." 442 U.S. at
279 n.25.
112. Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 at 266 (1977).
See also Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 93 (1986); Casteneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 494
n.13 (1977)("If a disparity is sufficiently large, then it is unlikely that it is due solely to chance
or accident, and, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, one must conclude that racial or
other class-related factors entered into the selection process."); Turner v. Fouche, 396 U.S.
346, 359 (1970)(comparing number of Blacks on grand jury list with number to be expected
from random selection).
113. Detroit Police Officers' Ass'n v. Young, 608 F.2d 671, 686 (6th Cir. 1979), cert.
denied, 452 U.S. 938 (1981).
114. Dowdell v. City of Apopka, 698 F.2d 1181, 1186 (lth Cir. 1983); United States v.
Texas Educ. Agency, 600 F.2d 518, 528 (5th Cir. 1979); Louisville Black Police Officers Org.,
Inc. v. City of Louisville, 511 F. Supp. 825, 832 (W.D. Ky. 1979), affid, 700 F.2d 268 (6th
Cir. 1983). Cf. Payne v. Travenol Labs., Inc., 673 F.2d 798, 817 (5th Cir. 1982)(in Title VII
disparate treatment case, prima facie case of intent may be established, under Arlington
Heights, "solely with statistics if they show a sufficiently great disparity between the em-
ployer's treatment of blacks and of whites - a disparate result. In such circumstances, statis-
tics alone justify an inference of discriminatory motive."), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1038 (1982).
115. Detroit Police Officers' Ass'n v. Young, 608 F.2d 671, 693 (6th Cir. 1979)(discrim-
inatory intent may be established by any evidence-including "actions having foreseeable and
anticipated disparate impact ...which logically supports an inference that the state action
was characterized by invidious purposes."), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 938 (1981); United States v.
Texas Educ. Agency, 579 F.2d 910, 913 n.5 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 443 U.S. 915
(1979); United States v. Texas Educ. Agency, 564 F.2d 162, 165-78 (5th Cir. 1977); Diaz v.
San Jose School Dist., 733 F.2d 660, 663 (9th Cir. 1984)(en banc), cert. denied, 471 U.S.
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 23, No. 3 [1989], Art. 1
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol23/iss3/1
OCCUPATIONAL TESTING
Disparate impact is of particular significance where it is the inevitable and
foreseeable consequence of a defendant's actions. The Supreme Court made
this point in Columbus Board of Education v. Penick," 6 less than a month
after Feeney.117
The fact that a defendant is aware of the discriminatory impact of its
actions but fails to take steps to investigate or remedy the problem is proba-
tive of discriminatory intent." 8 The Illinois Appellate Court in Golden Rule
1065 (1985); Dowdell v. City of Apopka, 698 F.2d 1181, 1186 (11 th Cir. 1983); Alexander v.
Youngstown Bd. of Educ., 675 F.2d 787, 792 (6th Cir. 1982); Hoots v. Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania, 672 F.2d 1107, 1114, 1116 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 824 (1982); United
States v. School Dist. of Omaha, 565 F.2d 127 (8th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1064
(1978); Larry P. v. Riles, 495 F. Supp. 926, 976 (N.D. Cal. 1979)(characterizing the reliance
on foreseeability as consistent with "a majority of federal appellate courts."), modified on
appeal, 793 F.2d 969, 984 (9th Cir. 1984)("pervasiveness of discriminatory effect" cannot
"without more, be equated with the discriminatory intent required by Washington v. Davis").
See also Arthur v. Nyquist, 573 F.2d 134, 141-43 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 860
(1978); United States v. Board of School Commr's of City of Indianapolis, 573 F.2d 400, 413
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 997 (1977).
This emphasis on the probative value of disparate impact where it was foreseeable is ap-
propriate in view of the principle that actions to enforce the constitutional right of equal pro-
tection under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 "should be read against the background of tort liability that
makes a man responsible for the natural consequence of his action." Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S.
167, 187 (1961). See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 253 (1976)(Stevens, J. concurring);
United States v. Texas Educ. Agency, 564 F.2d 162, 167-68 (5th Cir. 1977); United States v.
Texas Educ. Agency, 579 F.2d 910, 913 (5th Cir. 1978)(Monroe v. Pape rule "is the most
reliable [judicial mechanism] for the objective determination of intent.").
116. 443 U.S. 449 (1979).
117. In Penick, the Court said that:
.. . the District Court correctly noted that actions having foreseeable and anticipated
disparate impact are relevant evidence to prove the ultimate fact, forbidden purpose...
Adherence to a particular policy or practice, with full knowledge of the predictable ef-
fects of such adherence upon racial imbalance in a school system is one factor among
many others which may be considered by a court in determining whether an inference of
segregative intent should be drawn. The District Court thus stayed well within the re-
quirements of Washington v. Davis and Arlington Heights.
Id. at 464-65. While the Supreme Court stated, in Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 443 U.S.
526, 536-37 n.9 (1979), that, as a general proposition, the foreseeability of segregative effects
does not by itself make out a prima facie case of intentional discrimination or "routinely" shift
the burden of proof to a defendant, the Court did not reject the application of such a presump-
tion per se; the presumption may still be applied in a proper case. See, e.g., Larry P. v. Riles,
495 F. Supp. 926, 979 (N.D. Cal. 1979), modified on appeal, 793 F.2d 969 (9th Cir. 1984).
118. Penick, 443 U.S. at 465 (1979)(quoting district court). See also Rogers v. Lodge,
458 U.S. 613, 626 (1982); Richardson v. Pennsylvania Dept. of Health, 561 F.2d 489, 492 (3d
Cir. 1977); Dickerson v. United States Steel Corp., 472 F. Supp. 1304, 1352-53 (E.D. Pa.
1978) vacated and remanded by Worthy v. United States Steel Corp., 616 F.2d 698 (3d Cir.
1980); Delgado v. McTighe, 442 F. Supp. 725, 727-28 (E.D. Pa. 1977); Arnold v. Ray, 21
Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 793 (N.D. Ohio 1979); Price v. Denison Indep. School Dist.,
694 F.2d 334, 371 (5th Cir. 1982); Hoots v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 672 F.2d 1107,
1118 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 824 (1982); United States v. Texas Educ. Agency, 564
F.2d 162 (5th Cir. 1977). Cf. Diaz v. San Jose Unified School Dist., 733 F.2d 660, 663 n.l
1989]
Shapiro et al.: Minimizing Unnecessary Differences in Occupational Testing
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1989
242 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
upheld a claim under the equal protection clause that ETS and the Illinois
Insurance Director engaged in intentional discrimination by failing to act in
the face of test results which clearly showed significant disparate racial im-
pact.'" As a matter of policy and logic, a failure to act in the face of
known discriminatory effect should be strongly probative of intentional dis-
crimination. Where the racial disparities in test results are statistically sig-
nificant, they are not explainable by chance.' 20 For a defendant to allow
such disparities to continue without ascertaining the reason constitutes at
the very least reckless disregard for the consequences. In the absence of a
compelling showing to the contrary, inaction under such circumstances is
explainable only as willful omission. To find a constitutional violation under
such circumstances is entirely consistent with Washington v. Davis and its
progeny. It is uncertain, however, whether the Supreme Court is likely to
go this far.
3. Due Process
Alternatively, the due process clause may serve as the basis for a con-
stitutional claim even in the absence of class-based discrimination. The con-
cept of freedom to engage in an occupation has roots in early American
history.' 2' The Supreme Court has noted that the concept of liberty "de-
notes not merely freedom from bodily restraint but also the right of the
individual to contract, to engage in any of the common occupations of life,
to acquire useful knowledge . . . and generally to enjoy those privileges
long recognized . . . as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness of free
men."' 2 The Court also has said that "the right to work for a living in the
common occupations of the community is of the very essence of the per-
sonal freedom and opportunity that it was the purpose of the [Fourteenth]
Amendment to secure.' 112 3
As early as 1923, the Court announced the applicable due process
standard:
(9th Cir. 1984)(en banc)("[w]here, as here, the adverse consequences are clearly identified
and repeatedly articulated to the decisionmaking body, the inevitability of the adverse effects
provides a strong inference of illegitimate intent."), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1065 (1985). But cf.
United States v. City of Chicago, 549 F.2d 415, 435 (7th Cir. 1977)("that the [defendant]
must have been aware" of racially disparate impact was not enough to show purposeful dis-
crimination), cert. denied sub nom., Arado v. United States, 434 U.S. 875 (1977).
119. Golden Rule Life Ins. Co. v. Mathias, 86 I11. App. 3d 323, 408 N.E.2d 310 (1980).
120. See B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, supra note 70 at 98-99.
121. See, e.g., J. MADISON, Essay on Property & Liberty (1792) in THE COMPLETE
MADIsON-His BASIC WRITINGS 268 (S. Padover ed. 1953).
122. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923).
123. Traux v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33, 41 (1915). In Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S.
88, 102 (1976), the Court quoted with approval the passage quoted from Traux, 239 U.S. at
41.
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If [a state] purported to confer arbitrary discretion to with-
hold a license, or to impose conditions which have no relation to
the applicant's qualifications to practice [a profession] the stat-
ute would, of course, violate the due process clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment.124
The Court reaffirmed the application of the due process clause to occupa-
tional licensing in 1957, holding that the New York bar examiners deprived
an applicant of due process by refusing to grant him a license to practice
law.125 The Court stated that "a person cannot be prevented from practic-
ing except for valid reasons."' 2 To be constitutional, "any qualification
must have a rational connection with the applicant's fitness or capacity to
practice law.11 27
Lower courts have applied this standard to occupational licensing.128 In
particular, Martin v. Educational Testing Service 29 stated that there is "a
substantive right to be tested fairly and accurately."" 0 Accordingly, if it
can be shown that a licensing examination arbitrarily excludes qualified
persons from an occupation, the due process clause provides a remedy. The
challenge, however, is to establish that a test is sufficiently arbitrary to vio-
late due process.
The Golden Rule case is illustrative. The case arose as a consequence
of the multistate insurance agents licensing examination developed by ETS
with the sponsorship of the National Association of Insurance Commission-
124. Douglas v. Noble, 261 U.S. 165, 168 (1923).
125. Schware v. Board, of Examiners, 353 U.S. 232, 238-39 (1957).
126. Id. at 239 n.5 (1957).
127. Id. at 239.
128. See, e.g., Richardson v. McFadden, 540 F.2d 744, 750-51 (4th Cir. 1976)(bar ex-
aminer "acted arbitrarily and capriciously in violation of both Due Process and Equal Protec-
tion Clauses" in grading examinations and in deciding who passed in "borderline"
cases)(insufficient proof of due process violation), decision vacated on rehearing en banc, 563
F.2d 1130 (4th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 968 (1978); Brown v. Supreme Ct. of Ne-
vada, 476 F. Supp. 86 (D. Nev. 1979), rev'd on other grounds, Brown v. Board of Bar Exam-
iners, 623 F.2d 605 (9th Cir. 1980). But see Bigby v. City of Chicago, 766 F.2d 1053, 1058
(7th Cir. 1985)(stating in dictum that, in the absence of claims of racial discrimination, a
promotional examination could be deemed to violate the due process clause only if it "shock[s]
the conscience"), cert. denied sub nom. Thoele v. City of Chicago, 474 U.S. 1056 (1986).
129. 179 N.J. Super. 317, 431 A.2d 868, 872 (1981).
130. Id. at 321, 431 A.2d at 872. There is also a related procedural due process right,
which requires that a state or government agency may not impose an examination requirement
as a condition for receiving an entitlement (such as a high school diploma or a post-graduate
degree) without notice sufficient to give affected persons time to prepare for the examination.
See, e.g., Debra P. v. Turlington, 644 F.2d 397, 403-04 (5th Cir. 1981)(inadequate notice of
requirement for receipt of diploma to pass exit examination); Brookhart v. Illinois State Bd. of
Educ., 697 F.2d 179 (7th Cir. 1983); Mahavongsanan v. Hall, 529 F.2d 448 (5th Cir. 1976)
(adequate notice of new comprehensive examination requirement for receipt of master's
degree).
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ers (NAIC). Illinois was the first state to offer the test, in late 1975. In
mid-1976, Golden Rule Insurance Company and five individuals who had
failed the examination brought suit against ETS and the Director of the
Illinois Insurance Department. In addition to their claims of racial discrimi-
nation, plaintiffs alleged that ETS and the Illinois Insurance Director vio-
lated the due process clause with respect to the insurance agents licensing
examination. They claimed that the examination covered subject areas in-
appropriate to an entry-level examination, was complex 'and confusing in
form and structure and contained obscure and highly technical questions,
knowledge of which was inappropriate to an entry-level examination. The
test allegedly contained many questions subject to different interpretations
and different answers by individuals experienced and competent as insur-
ance agents and brokers. Additionally, the exam allegedly tested levels of
cognition of subject matter substantially and rationally unrelated to a deter-
mination of an applicant's competency as an insurance agent or broker. The
plaintiffs alleged that the test was given without any job validation to deter-
mine whether in fact it appropriately measured competency to engage in
the business of an insurance agent or broker, and was not fairly designed to
measure an applicant's competency. Instead, the test served as a method of
artificially limiting and controlling the number of individuals entering the
business of insurance agent or broker without regard for competency.131
Although the Illinois Appellate Court expressed doubt that these alle-
gations could be sustained at trial,'3 2 it held that they stated a claim under
the due process clauses of the federal and state constitutions."33 Apparently
then, the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides some
protection against arbitrary licensing examinations, even in the absence of
claims of racial or other discrimination.
131. Golden Rule Life Ins. Co. v. Mathias, 86 Ill. App. 3d 323, 326-27, 408 N.E.2d
310, 312-14 (1980).
132. Id. at 333, 408 N.E.2d at 318.
133. Id. at 333, 408 N.E.2d at 319.
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IV. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF RACIAL DATA
Both the Uniform Guidelines13' and the APA Standards'" require the
collection and analysis of test data by race, 136 as did the earlier 1970 EEOC
Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures."37 To determine whether a
test has an adverse impact on any protected racial group, racial statistics
are obviously required.
When Illinois became the first state to adopt the ETS insurance licens-
ing examinations in 1975, it had the assurance of the National Association
of Insurance Commissioners, the initial sponsor of the ETS program,"s8 that
the tests were "designed to be free from objection by the EEOC.""a 9 ETS
has professed for years that it "will adhere to the appropriate professional
standards" such as the APA Standards.140 The APA's 1985 revised Stan-
dard 3.10 provides:
When previous research indicates the need for studies of
item or test performance differences for a particular kind of test
for members of age, ethnic, cultural, and gender groups in the
population of test takers, such studies should be conducted as
soon as is feasible. Such research should be designed to detect
and eliminate aspects of test design, content, or format that
might bias test scores for particular groups. 4'
134. Uniform Guidelines, supra note 18.
135. See supra note 17. Courts have looked to the APA Standards in testing cases.
Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 247 n.13 (1976)(noting that APA Standards have been
relied upon by the EEOC in its guidelines and "have been judicially noted in cases where
validation of employment tests has been in issue [citing cases]"); Douglas v. Hampton, 512
F.2d 976, 984 n.59 (D.C. Cir. 1975)(APA Standards are "[tihe universally recognized profes-
sional authority" with regard to the techniques for establishing test validity); Walls v. Missis-
sippi Dept. of Public Welfare, 542 F. Supp. 281, 313-14 (N.D. Miss. 1982)("[t]est developers
are also required to follow standards established by the [APA] .... ").
136. Uniform Guidelines, supra note 18, § 4, 29 C.F.R. § 1607.4.
137. Guidelines on Employee Selection Process 35 Fed. Reg. 12,333-34 (1970).
138. The NAIC sponsored ETS's multi-state insurance licensing testing program from
that program's inception in 1975. See 1976 Vol. I NAIC Proceedings at 280. In 1984, the
NAIC withdrew its sponsorship. See 1985 Vol. I NAIC Proceedings at 152; ETS 1986 MILP
Advisory Board Meeting at 1 (1986).
139. 1975 Vol. II NAIC Proceedings at 252. Whether the tests were in fact developed
in accordance with the EEOC Guidelines was an issue which had not been resolved by the
court at the time Golden Rule was settled.
140. ETS Standards for Quality and Fairness 10 (1983). A version of ETS Standards
published in 1981 had the same provision. ETS, Standards For Quality and Fairness 12
(1981). [hereinafter ETS Standards] Specifically with respect to its occupational examina-
tions, ETS has said that "COPA tests meet the highest professional standards for validity, job-
relatedness, reliability, and equating [comparability across forms]." The Center for Occupa-
tional & Professional Assessment, Licensing, Certification & Assessment 4 (ETS 1983).
141. APA Standards supra note 17, § 3.10. This standard is denoted "Conditional." A
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The APA's comment on Standard 3.10 suggests that, while such studies
may not be feasible prior to the first use of a test, operational use provides
the occasion for assembling and studying the data to determine if there is
bias.""
In October 1981, ETS's trustees formally adopted a set of internal
guidelines, which previously had been in use at ETS. 43 One guideline pro-
vided that ETS should engage in research to maintain the quality of opera-
tional programs, including "studies to determine the sources of significant
differential performance of sex, ethnic, handicapped, and other relevant
subgroups on ETS tests."'1 44 Another guideline highlighted the importance
of descriptive statistics "in order to monitor the participation and perform-
ance of males and females drawn from diverse backgrounds, interests and
experience (e.g., major ethnic group handicapped status and other relevant
subgroups of the population of interest.) 1 14 5 A third guideline, relating to
"Test Validity," provided that when appropriate and feasible "the validity
of a test should be investigated separately for subsamples of the test-taking
population .... "14 A later edition of ETS's Standards retained the sub-
stance of these guidelines. 14- 7
It is therefore most troublesome that, from the introduction in October
1975 of the ETS-prepared insurance licensing examinations until the 1984
Golden Rule settlement, ETS did not collect or analyze by race any Illinois
test statistics. 48 Even more disturbing is the failure of the Illinois Depart-
ment of Insurance to insist that ETS do so. Nevertheless, the information
that was available suggested that there was a problem. Some 1977-78 sta-
tistics compiled by ETS from comparable insurance examinations in Wis-
conditional standard "should be considered primary [i.e., "should be met by all tests before
their operational use and in all test uses, unless a sound professional reason is available to show
why it is not necessary, or technically feasible, to do so in a particular case"] for some situa-
tions and secondary [i.e., "desirable as goals but are likely to go beyond reasonable expecta-
tions in many situations"] for others." APA Standards, supra note 17, Introduction at 3 (1985
ed.). "[I]f the use of a test is likely to have serious consequences for test takers, especially if a
large number of people may be affected, conditional standards assume increased importance."
Id. Although Standard 3.10 only requires studies of item or test performance differences
"when previous research indicates the need for [such studies]," it is at least arguable that,
given the widely observed phenomenon of disparities in item and test performance as between
racial and ethnic groups, studies of "performance differences for a particular kind of test" are
required by Standard 3.10. Id.
142. APA Standards, supra note 17, at 27.
143. ETS Standards, supra note 140, at iii, 21 (1981).
144. ETS Standards, supra note 140, at 10 (1981).
145. Id. at 24.
146. Id. at 26.
147. ETS Standards, supra note 140 (1983).
148. Golden Rule Life Ins. Co. v. Mathias, 86 Ill. App. 3d 323, 408 N.E.2d 310 (1980)
Transcript of Deposition of Laurel Seneca at 258 (Sept. 23, 1982); Id., Transcript of Deposi-
tion of William Kastrinos at 262 (May 5, 1983).
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consin' " showed statistically significant differences in passing rates between
White and Black candidates. 150 During the litigation, the Golden Rule
plaintiffs developed data151 which at least suggested that in Illinois the dis-
parities in passing rates likewise were substantial.152 Furthermore, ETS has
acknowledged that "[i]t is now widely recognized in the field of testing and
measurement that average scores of some groups differ consistently from
those of other subgroups on a wide range of standardized tests.'
5 3
It is plainly impossible to investigate for possible bias in a licensing test
without the regular collection and analysis of racial statistics. When, as re-
quired by the Golden Rule settlement, ETS first released comprehensive
data for Illinois test-takers in 1985,'15 the differences in White and Black
passing rates were at least as great as the Golden Rule plaintiffs had reason
to believe. On the life insurance examination, eighty-three percent of the
149. Letter dated April 12, 1978 from Stephen F. Heineck, Administrative Officer, Wis-
consin Office of Commissioner of Insurance, to Scott Renn, Center for Public Representation,
with attachment.
150. With respect to the Wisconsin life examination, the probability of such a distribu-
tion of scores happening by chance is less than one and one-half times in 100,00. With respect
to the Wisconsin accident and health examination, there was a probability of approximately
six in 10,000 of this distribution occurring by chance. Thus, not only were the differences
between the passing rates of Black examinees and White examinees statistically significant,
they were so extreme as to give rise to an inference of intentional discrimination. A leading
text explains: "It has become a convention in social science to accept as statistically significant
values that have a probability of occurring by chance 5 percent of the time or less. Many
courts have required, or cited with approval, this conventional standard." B. SCHLEI & P.
GROSSMAN, supra note 70, at 1372 (footnotes omitted). See Hazelwood School Dist. v. United
States, 433 U.S. 299, 308-09 n.14 (1977)("[a]s a general rule for such large samples, if the
difference between the expected value and the observed number is greater than two or three
standard deviations, then the hypothesis that teachers were hired without regard to race would
be suspect,")(quoting Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 496-97 n.17.) But cf. Watson v.
Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 108 S. Ct. 2777 (1988), where a plurality eschewed reference to a
"rigid mathematical formula." Id. at 2789.
151. Amended Complaint at 25, Golden Rule Life Ins. Co. v. Mathias, 86 I11. App. 3d
323, 408 N.E.2d 310 (1980) (No. 419-76). Since neither ETS nor the Illinois Insurance De-
partment collected or maintained racial identifying information with respect to applicants for
insurance agents' or brokers' licenses, the preliminary study was based on photographs at-
tached to each license application submitted to the Illinois Insurance Department. See Affida-
vit of Suzanne M. Schoolmaster (March 23, 1978) and Affidavit of Donald L. Glick (March
23, 1978) at 2. Golden Rule Life Ins. Co. v. Mathias, 86 Ill. App. 3d 313, 408 N.E.2d 310
(1980). For this reason and others ETS criticized the methodology as unreliable. See also,
Affidavit of Dr. F. Reid Creeck (April 27, 1978) at 5.
152. The probability of the life insurance examination yielding such differences by
chance was approximately one in one hundred (2.65 standard deviations); the probability for
the accident and health examination was approximately one in one thousand (3.37 standard
deviations). Like the Wisconsin figures, these differences are statistically significant.
153. Brief Amicus Curiae of Educational Testing Service at 20, United States v. Texas,
No. 85-2579 (5th Cir. Oct. 4, 1985).
154. ETS, Illinois Candidates for Licensure in Life Insurance and Accident & Health
Insurance (Apr. 1986).
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Whites passed, but only fifty-nine percent of the Blacks. 55 On the accident
and health insurance examination, seventy-four percent of the Whites
passed, but only forty-one percent of the Blacks. These differences exceed
fourteen standard deviations. Since 1.96 standard deviations is statistically
significant, and the probability of seven standard deviations is approxi-
mately one in one million, these differences are most disturbing.
Not the least important accomplishment of the Golden Rule litigation
was the discovery that neither ETS nor the responsible Illinois officials had
considered it necessary or appropriate to perform the statistical analyses
virtually mandated by the Uniform Guidelines and the APA Standards, not
to mention ETS's own internal guidelines. The Golden Rule settlement re-
quires that statistics by racial group be compiled, analyzed, and regularly
published.
Nonetheless, definitively establishing significant differences in White-
Black passing rates simply poses the problem. Some analysts contend that
the disparity can be explained in terms of differences in education and in
the degree to which candidates are prepared for the tests. Others argue that
the examinations are culturally biased against Blacks, a bias having its
roots in the fact that most tests are prepared largely by middle-class
Whites. Debating these conflicting points of view is not likely to lead to
constructive conclusions.
As a matter of public policy, occupational testing should not exclude
any qualified persons from engaging in occupations of their choice. If steps
can be taken to minimize differences in White-Black success rates without
compromising the efficacy of the tests as measures of qualification, those
steps should be taken.
V. THE GOLDEN RULE SETTLEMENT
The Golden Rule plaintiffs' principal objectives had been to reduce ra-
cial differences in performance on the test and to make the test develop-
ment process open to public scrutiny and accountability. In November
1984, after more than eight years of litigation, the suit was settled. The
settlement agreement in large part achieved the objective of public scrutiny
and accountability by requiring the annual public reporting of test data and
by providing for oversight by an independent advisory committee. The set-
tlement achieved the objective of reducing racial differences in test per-
formance by establishing a procedure for assembling test forms based on
selecting test questions which had the least difference in Black-White cor-
155. The data are based on the results of over 9,600 persons who took the life insurance
examination, and over 6,600 who took the accident and health examination. Id. at Tables I &
XI.
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rect-answer rates.
The significance of the settlement lies not only in the changes required
in the way ETS assembles insurance licensing tests in Illinois, but also in
the opportunity provided to measure the extent to which differential racial
success rates can be minimized. After examining the principal features of
the settlement agreement, the authors assess the legal and psychometric
ramifications for occupational licensing brought about by the settlement.
A. The Salient Features of the Settlement
1. Reporting Requirements
The settlement requires that each examinee be asked to provide volun-
tarily his or her ethnic or racial identification and educational level.156 This
information is to be used for reporting the racial effects of the examination
and for guiding the assembly of new test forms.157 Two public reports are
required by May 1 of each year based on data collected during the preced-
ing calendar year. The first, an "examination report," provides "bottom
line" information with respect to each part of the examination' 58 by race,
educational level, and educational level within each racial group. 59 Specifi-
cally, the report shows certain data for all examinees, and separately by
racial group, educational level, and educational level within each racial
group. This information includes the number of examinees, the percentage
passing each part of the examination, the percentage passing both parts,
and the mean scaled scores and standard deviation on each part. The report
also shows the distribution of scaled scores on each part for Black examin-
ees and White examinees with a high school diploma or G.E.D.
The second annual report, an "item report," provides information with
respect to each individual test question administered for scoring purposes
during the preceding calendar year. 60 Specifically, the item report shows
for each question, for all examinees combined and separately for Black ex-
156. Setttlement Agreement and General Release, Golden Rule Life Ins. Co. v. Wash-
burn, no. 419-76 (Cir. Ct. Sangamon County, Ill., settled on Nov. 20, 1984) [hereinafter
Golden Rule Settlement].
157. Golden Rule Settlement, supra note 156, at 8-12.
158. The insurance licensing examination is offered in several separate lines of insur-
ance, such as life or accident and health. To be licensed in a particular line, a candidate must
pass a two part test. Part I is intended to test general product knowledge. Part 2 tests topics
specific to each state, such as statutory and regulatory provisions concerning insurance agents.
During any given year, several different test forms are administered for parts 1 and 2.
159. Golden Rule Settlement, supra note 156, at 4-5.
160. Golden Rule Settlement, supra note 156, at 5-6. The item report includes statisti-
cal information on "operational items," i.e., questions used for scoring purposes, but not on
"pretest items." Id.
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aminees and White examinees, the correct answer rates and the r-biserial
correlations.161 The reporting of item statistics permits further analysis to
determine whether certain question formats, content areas, or cognitive
levels are responsible for a significant portion of any disparity. The item
statistics also provide a basis for selecting questions for new test forms so as
to diminish, over time, the over-all racial differences. 6 '
2. Selection of Test Questions
The most significant provision of the Golden Rule settlement estab-
lishes a procedure for selecting test questions: when new test forms are as-
sembled, questions in each content area having the least difference in cor-
rect answer rates between Black examinees and White examinees must be
preferred. 16 3 The rationale is that, as a matter of fairness, if several ques-
tions cover the same content area and are of equal content validity, ques-
tions with the least difference in correct answer rates between racial groups
should be used. All other things being equal, it is sound public policy to use
questions having the least adverse effect on either racial group.
The test assembly procedure required by the settlement has three
phases, each of which is carried out within each content area as defined by
the test's content specifications. Significantly, because the procedure applies
within each content area, the methodology has no effect on which topics are
covered or on the weight attributed to each. Nor does the methodology re-
sult in an imbalance of questions available for testing on the various topics.
The test developer and user-wholly independent of the settlement- deter-
mine the content areas, based on a job analysis or other features of the test
development process.''
161. Golden Rule Settlement, supra note 156, at 5-6. R-biserials are used to measure
the correlation of the performance on an item with performance on a set of items (often the
total test score). R-biserial is the correlation coefficient adjusted for attenuation of range.
162. See infra text accompanying notes 185-190.
163. Golden Rule Settlement, supra note 156, at 9-12. The settlement uses absolute
values with respect to racial differences. Thus, for example, an item in a given content area
with a difference of .05 favoring Whites would be used before an item having a difference of
.10 favoring Blacks.
164. A critic of the settlement has argued that "[tihe major problem [with "the Golden
Rule approach"] involves the distortion of the proportionate weight of subject matter covered
by an exam which is established by the content validation process to reflect 'on-the-job' compe-
tence requirements." Rebell, Disparate Impact of Teacher Competency Testing on Minorities:
Don't Blame the Test-takers - or the Tests, 4 YALE L. & PoL'Y REV. 375, 394 (1986). Such
criticism, however, ignores the fundamental premise of the "Golden Rule" methodology: that
the classification, ranking, and selection of test questions are carried out separately within
each content area. Golden Rule Settlement, supra note 156, at 8-13. Thus, for example, on the
50-item Part 1 of the life insurance examination, ETS uses eighteen different major content
areas (many of which are divided into smaller content areas) within which the selection pro-
cess is separately followed. See ETS Multistate Insurance Licensing Program, Life Test Con-
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The first phase, classification, entails sorting questions in each content
area into two types (I and II).63 To be considered Type I, a question must
meet two criteria: (1) a minimum correct answer rate for all examinees,
White examinees, and Black examinees, 66 and (2) a maximum difference
in correct-answer rates between Black examinees and White examinees. 167
Type II questions are questions that fail to meet either or both of these
criteria.168 Following classification of questions into Type I or Type II, the
questions are ranked. In each content area, Type I questions are ranked in
order by the difference in correct answer rates between Black examinees
and White examinees,' 6 9 and Type II questions are similarly ranked.170
Questions with the least correct answer rate difference are on top, with
questions having greater differences placed below.
The third phase of the process, selection of individual questions for
assembly into new test forms, involves selecting, within each content area,
Type I questions, using first those questions with the least racial difference
in correct answer rates .17 Type II questions are used in a content area only
when Type I questions are exhausted. 72 Type II questions, when used, are
used in order of increasing racial difference in correct answer rates. 78
With a sufficiently large supply of items in each content area, the pro-
cess should yield test forms consisting of questions with the least differences
in passing rates between racial groups. To assure that the question pool will
be ample, the settlement requires that new questions be pre-tested, that is,
included in test forms but not counted in the test score.'74 Racial statistics
tent Outline (Part I). There can be no distortion of content coverage.
165. Golden Rule Settlement, supra note 156, at 9-10.
166. Specifically, the criterion is that the questions have correct-answer rates for Black
examinees, White examinees, and all examinees "not lower than forty percent (40%) at the
.05 level of statistical significance ..... Id. at 10. For a question administered to 1,000
examinees, forty percent at the .05 level is equivalent to a correct answer rate of 36.96 or less.
The purpose of this criterion is to assure that the questions which are used have a correct
answer rate above the chance or guessing level (25% for a four-option multiple choice question
where there is no penalty for guessing).
167. The criterion is that "the correct answer rates of Black examinees and White ex-
aminees differ by no more than fifteen (15) percentage points at the .05 level of statistical
significance .... " Id. at 10. For a question administered to 1,000 examinees, a fifteen per-
centage point difference at the .05 level of statistical significance is equivalent to a difference
of approximately 20 percentage points assuming that ten percent of the examinees are Black
and the average correct answer rate is .70. The purpose of this criterion is to establish a
practical bench mark for distinguishing questions having relatively large racial differences.
168. Id. at 10.
169. Id. at 10-11.
170. Id. at 11.
171. Id. at 10-12.
172. Id. at 11.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 13-14. Pretest questions are denominated "Type III Items" in the Settle-
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are collected on the pre-test items"'5 and, when test forms are assembled,
pre-test questions are included in the pool of questions which are classified
as Type I or II, ranked within the appropriate content area in accordance
with the racial differences in correct answer rates and assembled into test
forms to the extent they rank higher than questions previously used as oper-
ational items.176 With the continued pre-testing of questions, questions as-
sembled into test forms will have progressively fewer differences in correct
answer rates between racial groups, at least until a point of irreducible dif-
ference is achieved. Indeed, one of the more interesting empirical questions
which the settlement may illuminate is the extent to which it is possible to
eliminate or reduce such racial differences.
By using statistical criteria, the settlement recognizes that, even after
questions which have the greatest disparities in correct-answer rates be-
tween racial groups are identified, it may not be possible to explain such
disparities on the basis of a facial analysis of the questions. There may well
be questions having relatively large differences in the correct answer rates
between racial groups, yet experts from various fields-multi-cultural lin-
guists, insurance practitioners, and test developers--cannot identify any ele-
ment in content, format, or language which would account for the
differences.
3. Other Provisions
Under the settlement, every other year a test form and answer key for
each part of each examination must be made public. As with the Truth-in-
Testing legislation in New York,17 the objective is to provide public ac-
countability and to help prospective examinees prepare for the examination.
The settlement sets additional standards. A reading level standard re-
quires that the reading level of the examinations be at the high school
level.17 8 In addition the examinations must adhere to the APA Stan-
dards.17 9 By adopting the APA Standards, the settlement requires, at a
minimum, that the examinations be content-valid 80 and that they be shown
to be job-related based upon a job analysis.81 The requirement of content
ment. Id. at 13.
175. Id. at 14.
176. Id. at 14-15.
177. New York Educational Testing Act of 1979, N.Y. EDuc. LAw §§ 340-348 (Mc-
Kinney 1988).
178. Golden Rule Settlement, supra note 156, at 7-8.
179. Id. at 6-7. The Settlement also requires that ETS adhere to its "Standards for
Quality & Fairness." Id. Even prior to entering into the settlement, ETS had claimed to ad-
here to the APA Standards, see supra, text accompanying note 140.
180. APA Standards, supra note No. 11.1.
181. APA Standards, supra note 17, Nos. 1.6, 11.1 & Comment to Standard No. 11.1
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validity exists even in the absence of a showing of adverse racial impact. As
indicated above, 182 the APA Standards require differential validation stud-
ies (a showing that the examinations are valid for different racial groups)
where prior research indicates that racial groups perform differently.183
B. Legal Significance of the Settlement
The Golden Rule settlement establishes detailed standards, procedures,
time-tables and a system for monitoring compliance. By entering into the
settlement, ETS seemingly recognized that it is feasible to minimize racial
differences in correct answer rates. The settlement establishes a standard
against which acts and omissions of test developers and users may be
judged. The settlement may be viewed as a "less-discriminatory alterna-
tive" to other testing methods, thereby allowing plaintiffs to establish liabil-
ity even where defendants have shown that a test is content valid. Further,
to the extent the settlement procedures have become known in the testing
industry,"" the knowing failure to use them might constitute evidence of
intentional discrimination.
In addition to its potential use as a "sword," the settlement may serve
as a "shield." Employers, government agencies, and other entities subject to
anti-discrimination laws (Title VII, constitutional standards, or state civil
rights laws) may well reduce their exposure to suit by taking appropriate
steps to reduce adverse racial impact. Using a procedure for selecting test
questions having the smallest racial differences in correct answer rates
should decrease such impact.
C. Psychometric Significance of the Settlement
1. Effect of the Settlement in Reducing Racial Differences
The annual reports prepared by ETS pursuant to the Golden Rule set-
at 64. Cf. APA Standards, supra note 17, No. 10.4.
182. See supra, note 141 and accompanying text.
183. APA Standards, supra note 17, No. 3.10. See also Comment to Standard No. 3.10
at 27 and Introduction at 2-3.
184. The settlement has been discussed in an official publication of the American Psy-
chological Association. Anrig, 'Golden Rule'. Second Thoughts, 18 APA MONITOR No. 1 at 3
(Jan. 1987). It has also been the subject of questioning by the APA's Committee on Psycho-
logical Tests & Assessment. Committee on Psychological Tests & Assessment, American Psy-
chological Assoc., Implications for Test Fairness of the 'Golden Rule' Company Settlement
(August 11, 1988). ETS and Golden Rule also have debated the settlement in the literature.
See Rooney, Golden Rule on Golden Rule, 6 EDUC. MEASUREMENT: ISSUES & PRAC. No. 2 at
9 (Summer 1987); Anrig, ETS on "Golden Rule," 6 EDuc. MEASUREMENT: ISSUES & PRAC.,
No. 3 at 24 (Fall 1987); Rooney, A Response From Golden Rule to "ETS on 'Golden Rule',"
6 EDuc. MEASUREMENT: ISSUES & PRAC. No. 4 at 19 (Winter 1987).
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tlement contain data permitting a comparison of the performance of Black
and White candidates on traditionally-assembled (i.e., pre-settlement) test
forms and on forms assembled under the settlement. The settlement speci-
fies that, within each content area, items are to be selected in order of in-
creasing differences in Black-White correct answer rates. In practice, how-
ever, ETS has apparently given lower priority to this requirement than to
its traditional test-assembly criteria. The selection of test items with the
least Black-White differences within each content area has therefore been
affected by other considerations: (1) providing specific numbers of items
within each of three "cognitive levels"-knowledge, application/analysis,
and evaluation; (2) providing specific numbers of items within each of four
"item types"--negative stems, classification sets, roman numeral format,
and four-choice positive stems; (3) satisfying a predetermined distribution
of item difficulty levels; and (4) satisfying minimum value criteria for pro-
portion-correct and r-biserial statistics.
In addition to these factors, which tend to mitigate the effects of the
settlement, the actual item pool is far smaller than originally anticipated
because of asserted security breaches, ETS's decision to release a test form
containing previously viable items, and changes in the law which rendered
obsolete many state items. These actions, as well as others,' 85 served to
work against the reduction in Black-White differences. However, despite
the relatively low priority apparently accorded by ETS to reducing racial
differences, the differences in Black-White correct answer rates and in pass-
ing rates have been statistically significantly reduced.
Test forms assembled according to the terms of the settlement were
first introduced in 1986, but were not used exclusively as Part 1 forms until
1987. The passing rates of Black and White examinees on the Part 1 tests
for 1985 and 1987"86 provide a basis for determining the effects of the set-
tlement upon the disparity between Black and White passing rates. The
annual reports contain data showing the number of examinees and the pass-
ing percentages rounded to the nearest one percent, but not the precise
number of examinees passing. Data are reported for examinees from three
educational levels, each of which contained a minimum of 100 examinees
from each racial group. The pertinent data are as follows:
185. For example, some forms were "double-equated," so that approximately 70% of
the items selected had appeared in previous forms. The criteria for selecting equating items
were given higher priority than the settlement's requirement of choosing items with the least
racial difference in correct-answer rates.
186. Data for 1986 were not used in this analysis because during that year both pre-
settlement (traditional) forms and post-settlement ("Golden Rule") forms were administered.
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TABLE 1
1985 Traditional Forms
Number of Percentage
Examinees Passing
LIFE INSURANCE EXAM
White
HS/GED
Some Coll.
4yr Deg.+
Black
1608
2879
2256
1987 Golden Rule Forms
Number of Percentage
Examinees Passing
1635
3496
3646
HS/GED 194 56
Some Coil. 537 65
4yr Deg. + 283 82
ACCIDENT & HEALTH INSURANCE EXAM
White
HS/GED
Some Coll.
4yr Deg.+
Black
HS/GED
Some Coll.
4yr Deg.-+
1491
,3045
3291
1011
2021
1794
140
375
188
These data can be statistically analyzed by converting the passing rates into
the number of examinees passing and failing the examination within each
group. The most conservative method of analysis was used: (1) the number
passing in 1985 was calculated as the largest number which would satisfy
the passing percentage; (2) the number passing in 1987 was calculated as
the smallest number which would satisfy the passing percentage; (3) the
Mantel-Haenszel equation was used for each educational group separately
within each Part 1 test; 87 and (4) a correction for continuity was
187. The Mantel-Haenszel Chi-squared provides for the calculation, within each sub-
group of data, of the variance and of the difference between observed and expected values. The
Chi-squared statistic is computed as the square of the sum, over all subgroups of data, of the
differences between observed and expected values divided by the sum, over all the subgroups of
data, of the variances. N. Mantel & W. Haenszel, Statistical Aspects of the Analysis of Data
From Retrospective Studies of Disease, 22 JOURNAL OF THE NATIONAL CANCER INSTITUTE
719 (1959).
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subtracted.'88
Using this conservative approach, which also controlled for educational
level, Black passing rates improved statistically significantly by 4.532 stan-
dard deviations whereas White passing rates decreased insignificantly by
0.697 standard deviations.'89 Thus, there has been a significant decrease in
the gap between Black and White passing rates since the adoption of the
test assembly procedures required by the settlement.""0
2. The Effect of the Settlement on the Psychometric Quality of the
Examinations
To determine the effect the settlement is having on the psychometric
quality of the examinations, regression analyses were performed.
188. The correction is applied by subtracting 0.5 from the absolute value of the sum,
over all the subgroups of data, of the differences between observed and expected values.
189. The number of standard deviations is equal to the square root of the Mantel-Haen-
szel Chi-squared.
190. Further, comparing traditional forms with "Golden Rule" forms, there has been a
statistically significant decrease in the average difference between Black and White correct
answer rates.
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Table 2
Illinois Life Insurance Licensing Examination
UL1-UL6 Pre-Golden Rule
UL7-UL8 Golden Rule - Social Security Item Pool
UL9-UL10 Golden Rule - 1985 Item Pool
SL1-SL3 Pre-Golden Rule
SL4 Golden Rule
W W W W B B B B T T W-B W-B
p + p+ rbis rbis p+ p+ rbis rbis rbis rbis p+ p+
1986 mean est mean est mean est mean est mean est mean est
Form SD SD SD SD SD SD
ULI .691 .174
2 .680 .193
3 .701 .161
4 ,.701 .172
5 .709 .169
6 .736 .143
7 .720 .021
8 .725 .158
9 .697 .180
10 .707 .186
SLI .675 .176
2 .636 .197
3 .627 .205
4 .761 .140
p +
r a
ULI .930 .190
2 .965 .130
3 .915 .180
4 .929 .180
5 .948 .196
6 .847 .296
7 .921 .202
8 .934 .201
9--
10 .948 .136
SLI .930 .120
2 .950 .111
3 .936 .090
4 .953 .185
.450 .130 .590 .190 .381
.413 .139 .595 .201 .400
.432 .123 .588 .167 .424
.429 .143 .608 .186 .413
.475 .138 .575 .180 .441
.485 .141 .620 .170 .400
.439 .133 .620 .167 .387
.434 .128 .625 .176 .426
.446 .144
.430 .111 .639 .198 .402
.409 .147 .584 .172 .391
.425 .118 .537 .192 .411
.426 .149 .539 .193 .376
.448 .126 .686 .158 .485
rbis
b r a b Nw
.849 .706 .223 .595 1016
.923 .734 .165 .621 1314
.886 .681 .175 .605 1393
.858 .705 .182 .599 966
.892 .574 .251 .507 821
.710 .673 .234 .627 955
.835 .800 .167 .703 1173
.837 .730 .171 .617 1321
-- 644
.895 .514 .305 .311 687
.949 .810 .085 .828 2425
.979 .822 .104 .782 2661
.995 .717 .155 .721 1223
.840 .517 .225 .460 1197
.154
.165
.138
.168
.157
.151
.151
.152
.183
.143
.124
.148
.142
.467 .127 .101 .070
.437 .151 .085 .053
.452 .126 .113 .068
.450 .148 .093 .069
.491 .122 .133 .057
.490 .142 .117 .090
.451 .133 .100 .065
.458 .130 .099 .063
.455 .136
.437 .115 .068 .063
.419 .147 .091 .065
.437 .116 .100 .062
.423 .142 .087 .072
.479 .128 .075 .049
Nb Nt
127 1350
193 1789
220 1865
158 1333
118 1670
133 1288
178 1565
209 1785
95 872
105 947
357 3876
412 3595
189 1666
173 1588
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Figures 3 and 4 contain graphic representations of the regressions for
two Part 1 Life forms administered in 1986,191 a traditional form (Form 1)
and a "Golden Rule" form (Form 10), for which summary statistics are
presented in Table 2.192 The top portion of Figure 3 contains the scatterplot
for Form 1 of the White proportion correct (ordinate) and the Black pro-
portion correct (abscissa). Each individual item is represented by a point on
the scatterplot. The two lines drawn on each scatterplot depict (1) the re-
gression line which best fits the points and (2) the diagonal line on which
all points would lie if White and Black item performances were equal. The
bottom portion of Figure 3 contains the comparable scatterplot for Form
10. Figure 4 contains the scatterplots of the White and Black r-biserial cor-
relation coefficients for the items on Form 1 (top) and Form 10 (bottom).
191. Data from 1986 are used because during that year both traditional and "Golden
Rule" forms were administered, thereby making comparisons readily available.
192. The Table contains the following data for each form: (1) the mean proportion of
correct answers (p+) on each item for White candidates; (2) the standard deviation of the
proportion of correct answers on the items of the test for White candidates; (3) the mean and
standard deviation of the r-biserial correlation coefficients of the test items for White candi-
dates; (4) the same statistics for Black candidates; (5) the mean and standard deviation of the
r-biserial correlation coefficients for the test items for the total group of candidates; (6) the
mean and standard deviation of the difference between White and Black correct-answer pro-
portions on the items of the test; (7) the correlation coefficient r, intercept (a), and slope (b) of
the White and Black correct answer proportions on the items of the test; (8) the correlation
coefficient, intercept, and slope of the White and Black r-biserial correlation coefficients on the
items of the test; and (9) the number of White, Black, and total test takers on each test form.
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Figure 3
1.0 Form UL
0.9
0.8 - ,
0.7- M M= mum•
+ d.6" -
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0.2-
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0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
Black P+
1.0- Form UL 10
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Figure 4
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A comparison of the top and bottom portions of Figure 3 reveals that
the relationship between White and Black proportions correct is very or-
derly on both forms, as a reflection of the large correlation coefficients, with
the points lying relatively close to the regression lines. The two graphs do
differ in the relationship between the diagonal line and the regression line,
as a reflection of the decreased White-Black difference on Form 10, with
the points for Form 10 lying generally closer to the diagonal line and the
regression line lying much closer to the diagonal line.
A comparison of the top and bottom portions of Figure 4 reveals that
the correlation between White and Black r-biserial correlation coefficients is
somewhat reduced for Form 10 as compared to Form 1; however, as indi-
cated by the points in the scatterplots, the actual values of the r-biserial
correlation coefficients are not different for either White or Black candi-
dates between Form 1 and Form 10. In addition, an examination of Table 2
reveals, with respect to "Golden Rule" and "pre-Golden Rule" forms, that
the means and standard deviations of the r-biserial correlation coefficients
are unaltered by the introduction of the "Golden Rule" forms, for White
candidates, for Black candidates, or for the total set of candidates. It is
clear from the data that the implementation of the settlement has not ad-
versely affected the psychometric properties of the examinations. ETS
shares this view. 193
193. Anrig, ETS on "Golden Rule," 6 EDUC. MEASUREMENT: ISSUES & PRAC. No. 3, 24
(Fall 1987).
This is not to say that there have not been misdirected psychometric attacks on the settle-
ment. For example, Linn and Drasgow, Implications of Judicial Decisions for Test Construc-
tion, 6 EDUC. MEASUREMENT: ISSUES & PRAC. No. 2, 13 (Summer 1987), base their criticism
on an assumed non-demonstrable difference in underlying ability between Blacks and Whites.
Id. at 15. See also supra note 164.
ETS researchers ran two experimental sections of the Graduate Record Examination
(GRE) in which they selected items within each content area which minimized Black-White
differences. Although reaching somewhat negative conclusions as to the desirability of using
"impact reduction techniques"-- unquestionably prompted by the Golden Rule Settle-
ment-the researchers recognized that:
First, such techniques can reduce impact... Second, the resulting tests can be made to
look parallel in form and content to conventionally constructed tests and meet their con-
tent specifications if the item pools are sufficiently large. Third, the average difficulty
level of the resulting tests can be maintained without changing current test development
procedures for adhering to average difficulty specifications. However, the distribution of
item difficulties will change... This may be a controllable phenomenon ...
Hackett, Test Construction Manipulating Score Differences Between Black and White Exam-
inees: Properties of the Resulting Tests at 31 (ETS, July 1987)(emphasis in original).
The ETS researchers note that one method of control involves requiring a specific distri-
bution of item difficulties (a requirement to which ETS adhered in constructing the Illinois
insurance examinations). Another method of control, not noted by the researchers, would in-
volve reducing the use of very high difficulty items (a requirement which was incorporated in
the Golden Rule Settlement).
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3. Expanding Use of the Golden Rule Methodology
The test-assembly principles of the settlement have been accepted in
their essentials by a national association of teacher-college educators.' 9 '
Legislation has been introduced in several states to extend these princi-
ples. 195 In essence, the bills would require the collection, analysis and public
reporting of racial data and the selection of questions for test forms having
the least racial difference in correct-answer rates.' In New York, legisla-
tion has been enacted which establishes a mechanism for collecting and an-
alyzing data on differential racial performance.' 97
ETS has resisted any extension of the Golden Rule settlement princi-
ples.'98 Indeed, ETS's president has confessed that he "made a mistake" in
approving the settlement, 19 in part, at least, because ETS did not foresee
that Golden Rule and others would seek to extend the methodology to other
types of examinations and to other states. ETS appears to believe it neces-
sary, in opposing any extension, to characterize the Golden Rule settlement
as an ad hoc solution to a unique problem.
ETS further considers that the Golden Rule procedure is based on a
faulty premise--"that group differences in performance on test questions
primarily are caused by 'bias.'"oo No such premise underlies the settle-
ment, since it makes no assumptions about "bias." Rather, its premise is
that if there are racial differences at the item level which can be reduced by
using questions having smaller racial differences in the same content areas
which test the same material at similar levels of cognition, fundamental
fairness requires that such differences be reduced, regardless of whether the
differences are caused by "bias" or by other factors which are not easily
measured. In effect, the settlement provides a means of reducing unneces-
sary racial differences.
While expressing displeasure with the settlement, ETS "supports [the]
use of appropriate statistical analyses of group differences in the process of
194. The settlement has been supported in principle by the American Association of
Colleges for Teacher Education. Daily, The Appropriate Role of Testing in the Teaching Pro-
fession? in WHAT IS THE APPROPRIATE ROLE OF TESTING IN THE TEACHING PROFESSION? 49,
55 (1987).
195. Wis. Assembly Bill 855 (1985-86 Legis.); Mass. Sen. Bill 758 (Jan. 1986); Calif.
Assembly Bills 4045-46 (1985-86 Reg. Sess.).
196. See supra note 195.
197. N.Y. Educ. Law §§ 341-a-346-a (McKinney 1988). This Legislation was approved
on June 29, 1987.
198. See, e.g., Statement by ETS With Respect to Wis. Assembly Bill 855, before Wis.
Assembly Committee on Financial Institutions & Insurance (Mar. 3, 1986).
199. Anrig, 'Golden Rule': Second Thoughts, 18 APA MONITOR No. 1 at 3 (Jan.
1987).
200. Id.
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selecting questions for tests." ' 1 It has identified one of these methods as
"differential item functioning."2 0 2 ETS began using this method in 1987 in
insurance licensing examinations (in states other than Illinois) and in
teacher tests in the National Teachers Examination (NTE) programs.2 0
ETS's position appears to be that differential item functioning is a prefera-
ble means of identifying "biased" questions.2 "' ETS proposes to compare
item responses of persons who received the same total score on the exami-
nation in order to determine if one or more individual questions might be
biased.20 5
Notwithstanding ETS's sponsorship, the differential item functioning
methodology is not an acceptable alternative to the Golden Rule approach.
The method of matching examinees on their total test score presumes that
(1) the total test score is a valid measure of knowledge of the subject mat-
ter tested, and (2) there is not even one biased question on the test which
would have resulted in examinees against whom the item is biased receiving
lower scores. The methodology by which ETS proposes to "confirm the fair-
ness of test questions" must therefore presume the collective fairness of all
test questions.
As has been noted, item analysis techniques can detect biased items
only if the degree of bias is greater for one or more items than the bias of
the other items on the examination. In discussing item response theory us-
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Id.; Letter dated November 21, 1985 from George Elford, Director, ETS Midwest-
ern Regional Office, to Hildegard Neujahr, Director of Administrative Services, Wisconsin
Insurance Commission [hereinafter "Elford letter"].
205. As ETS has explained:
The procedure begins with a very straightforward premise: If a test question is fair, peo-
ple who know the same amount about the subject being tested should have an equal
chance of answering the question correctly, regardless of race, ethnicity, gender, back-
ground and the like. For example, women and men with equal knowledge of mathematics
would be expected to do equally well on a fair mathematics question.
The first step in this procedure is therefore to identify clusters of people in the vari-
ous subgroups to be compared, who are matched in their knowledge of the subject being
tested. Estimates based on standardized test scores have proved to be an available, accu-
rate and reliable means for matching knowledge and ability. Thus, test-takers from dif-
ferent subgroups can be grouped in clusters based on their scores on the test as a whole.
The next step is to calculate how hard each question is for the members of each
subgroup within each cluster to be compared. Do women and men with comparable
scores on the test as whole do equally well on each question? The procedure yields a
numerical index for each question reflecting any differences in difficulty between sub-
groups within each cluster. The index augments well-established test fairness review pro-
cedures by flagging questions for intensive additional review. Based on this review, any
questions which may be unfair can be revised or eliminated.
Statement enclosed with Elford letter, supra note 204.
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ing what are called delta plots, Frederic Lord of ETS conceded that "we
could say that the items are all equally biased or, conceivably, equally unbi-
ased. '208 The differential item functioning method does nothing to eliminate
this problem; it presumes that the total test score is equal to knowledge,
and it makes no allowances for the possibility of biased items. For example,
if each item were ten percent biased (i.e., one group with equal knowledge
scored ten percent lower than another group), then the examinees against
whom the items were biased would be compared to examinees in the other
group who had ten percent less knowledge, but the method would identify
no biased items because it would reflect equal performances by both groups.
ETS's methodology matches examinees who receive the same total test
scores. However, if at least one item is biased, one group of examinees can-
not obtain the same total test score as another group even if both groups
have the same knowledge of the subject matter, unless other items are com-
pensatingly biased in their favor. Such a compensating situation where bi-
ased items offset each other is unlikely.
The statistical assumptions underlying differential item functioning are
satisfied only when the controlled factor, such as age in a smoking study, is
independent of the variable tested, such as the effect of smoking on death
rates.207 Applied to the test bias problem, it is clear that one cannot ration-
ally assume that total test scores are independent of individual item per-
formance; the test score is nothing but the sum of the item scores. Further,
ETS does not specify the level of statistical significance used in connection
with the differential item functioning methodology for identifying biased
questions. It is therefore impossible to predict-assuming the other flaws
did not exist-whether the methodology would be of any practical use in
identifying biased questions.
More fundamentally, however, ETS's approach uses the methodology
merely to identify biased items which are then subjected to some unspeci-
fied "intensive additional review." The approach thus relies on an appar-
ently standardless, subjective means of ultimately determining whether a
question is biased. The method assumes that it is possible to make an ulti-
mate determination of whether a question is biased by a facial review of the
question.
The Golden Rule settlement does not rely on a subjective review of
questions, since in many, if not most, cases, bias cannot be detected in that
206. F. LORD, APPLICATIONS OF ITEM RESPONSE THEORY TO PRACTICAL TESTING
PROBLEMS (ETS 1980) at 213.
207. See, e.g., E. Frome & H. Checkoway, Use of Poisson Regression Models in Esti-
mating Incidence Rates and Ratios, 121 AM. J. OF EPIDEMIOLOGY 309 (1985)(Mantel-Haen-
szel is "strictly suitable only when there is no interaction between relative risk and the
covariate. ... ).
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fashion. Statistical measures afford the sole objective and reliable means
not only of identifying possibly biased questions, but also of determining
whether a particular question should be used. If a statistical measure sug-
gests bias, a question should not be used when other questions having less
adverse impact on a particular group are available. The Golden Rule settle-
ment criteria are thus objective and self-executing.
VI. CONCLUSION
The testing industry's current practice of using only content validation
procedures and its wholly relative method of detecting bias preclude prov-
ing the existence or absence of test bias. Likewise, current legal standards
for determining liability for test bias involve allocating burdens of proof
which may be result-determinative.
As a practical matter, a plaintiff may be able to satisfy the Title VII
adverse impact standard where he or she would be unable to satisfy the
constitutional standard. Even so, Title VII plaintiffs must persuade the
courts that the statute applies to licensing and reaches private test
developers.
Quite apart from legal proceedings, the technical obstacles to proving
or disproving bias may be avoided by directly addressing the practical ques-
tion: can the purported purpose of a test be met if test developers take steps
to minimize racial differences to the greatest extent possible? Such an ap-
proach avoids the admitted inability of psychometricians to detect bias in
the absence of a valid, independent external criterion.
While the legal and psychometric issues relating to racial bias in occu-
pational testing continue to be in dispute, the Golden Rule settlement
avoids much of the debate. The settlement is a practical way of mitigating
racial differences without adversely affecting test content or validity. It
makes possible the development of both fairer test, and tests less subject to
legal challenges.
The Golden Rule settlement is certainly not the last word, but it may
help focus
the debate away from a strictly academic discussion of the issue
of racial bias toward a debate about practical solutions. If the
settlement goes beyond that, and succeeds in pushing ETS, other
test developers, and state regulators and legislators in the direc-
tion of establishing meaningful and accountable means of reduc-
ing unnecessary racial differences, it will have made a major
contribution toward ensuring equal opportunity for all."'
208. Rooney, A Response From Golden Rule to "ETS on 'Golden Rule'," 6 EDUC.
MEASUREMENT: ISSUES & PRAC. No. 4 at 19, 23 (Winter 1987).
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